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Sharp Lines
and Sliding Scales in Tax Law
EDWARD FOX AND JACOB GOLDIN*
INTRODUCTION
The law is full of sharp lines, where small changes in one's
circumstances lead to significant changes in legal treatment. Tax law is
no exception; someone who falls just to one side of a line may be taxed
quite differently from someone else who falls just to the other side,
even when the two situations are otherwise quite similar. Consider the
following examples:
" The sale of a capital asset held for 366 days is eligible
for the preferential rate on capital gains, but the sale of
the same asset held for 364 days is not.1
" Taxpayers who contribute appreciated property to a
corporation in exchange for stock do not recognize gain
or loss if they own at least 80% of the corporation after
the transaction; if the taxpayers own only 79%, they
recognize the gain.2
" An employer with fifty-one employees is required to
offer health insurance coverage to its employees or face
a penalty; an employer with forty-nine employees is
not.3
* Fox: Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Goldin: Associate
Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. For helpful comments, we are grateful to Joseph
Bankman, Thomas Brennan, Anzhela C6delle, Barbara Fried, Adam Kolber, Susan Morse,
Louis Kaplow, Saul Levmore, Kyle Logue, Mitchell Kane, Michael Smart, Emily
Satterthwaite, Richard Schmalbeck, Wolfgang Schdn, Daniel Shaviro, Joel Slemrod, Jeff
Strnad, Andrew Verstein, Manoj Viswanathan, David Weisbach, Lawrence Zelenak, and
workshop participants at Columbia, Duke, Harvard, Max Planck Institute, Stanford,
University of Michigan, University of San Diego, University of Toronto, University of
Virginia, Junior Tax, the Centre for Business Taxation at Oxford, and the annual meetings
of the National Tax Association and the American Law and Economics Association. For
valuable suggestions and editorial guidance, we are especially grateful to Mitchell Kane,
Eleanor Wilking, and the editorial staff of the Tax Law Review.
I IRC §§ 1(h), 1222.
2 IRC §§ 351, 368(c).
3 IRC § 4980H(c)(2).
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" A child born on New Year's Eve can qualify the parent
for the full year's Child Tax Credit; a child born the next
day yields no tax benefits for the prior year.4
" For certain states, an individual who spends 183 days of
the year in the state is considered a resident, whereas
an individual who spends 182 days in the state is not.5
In many cases, a sharp line can be smoothed out by replacing it with
a sliding scale. Whereas classification under a sharp line is all-or-
nothing, a sliding scale classifies individuals in proportion to where
they fall along some continuum. Hence, under a sliding scale, small
changes to a situation lead to small changes in the legal outcome. To
illustrate, a sliding scale might allow taxpayers to claim the Child Tax
Credit in proportion to the share of the year that elapses after the
child's birth. Similarly, a sliding scale for long-term capital gains might
gradually phase in the preferential tax rate based on the holding
period-say, between six and eighteen months.6
Historically, a significant disadvantage of sliding scales compared to
sharp lines was their complexity; in an age when taxpayers or their
accountants calculated taxes by paper and pencil, the extra work
required to apply a sliding scale would usually have dwarfed the
benefits-especially when applied to the tax rules governing
individuals. Today, however, the vast majority of tax returns are
prepared electronically. As a result, complexity concerns are no longer
as important a barrier to sliding scales as they once were.
Motivated by this development, we study the policy choice between
sharp lines and sliding scales in tax law. We compare the two
approaches along a range of dimensions, including efficiency,
complexity, and fairness. Our main conclusion is that sliding scales
deserve consideration in many of the settings in which the tax law
currently employs a sharp line. For many of these classifications, there
is a strong case for converting the sharp line into a sliding scale. We
illustrate the principles that emerge from our analysis by applying them
to several real-world examples: child tax benefits, taxation of capital
gains, conventions for depreciable property, state residency rules, and
treatment of debt and equity instruments.
We begin by comparing the efficiency properties of sharp lines and
sliding scales. Drawing on a simple model of taxpayer behavior, we find
that the relative efficiency of the two approaches depends on the
pattern of choices that taxpayers would make in the absence of tax
4 IRC §§ 24,152.
5 See, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 290.01, subd. 7(b) (2019).
6 As we discuss below, each of the sharp lines listed in the prior paragraph could be
replaced by a sliding scale.
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considerations. Intuitively, a sharp line only affects those taxpayers
whose behavior would put them close to the line, but it can significantly
distort the behavior of this group. In contrast, a sliding scale affects
more taxpayers, but the magnitude of the distortion it generates is
smaller. We conduct simulations to explore these trade-offs under a
range of assumptions about taxpayer preferences and behavior. We
find that the efficiency rationale for a sharp line is strongest when few
taxpayers are close to where it would be drawn. When this is not the
case, we find that sliding scales tend to be more efficient.
We next consider the relative complexity of sharp lines and sliding
scales. Although sliding scales make it harder for taxpayers to compute
their precise tax liability, we argue that this consideration is rarely
compelling given the large share of taxpayers whose returns are
prepared electronically. On the other hand, sliding scales can require
more information about taxpayers than sharp lines, and this form of
complexity affects even those using assisted preparation methods. We
argue that the force of this concern varies greatly by setting. With
respect to determining state residency, for example, a sliding scale
might entail large costs if it requires tracking the precise number of
days one spends in each state. In contrast, using a sliding scale for tax
benefits based on a child's birth date would not require taxpayers to
keep track of any new information.
We then explore how sliding scales and sharp lines interact with
fairness considerations and the objectives of specific provisions of the
tax code. Although it is difficult to draw broad conclusions here, we
make two general observations. First, sliding scales tend to be
preferable when a provision's objective applies similarly to taxpayers
who would fall on opposite sides of a sharp line.7 For example, if child
tax benefits are motivated by households with children having lower
ability to pay, it follows that taxpayers with children born on December
31 and January 1 should be taxed similarly, because both support a
child for similar amounts of time. Second, where the goal of a provision
is to shape taxpayer behavior, our conclusions are the mirror image of
those that apply in the efficiency analysis. That is, sharp lines are more
effective than sliding scales at shaping behavior for taxpayers close to
7 For a related argument with examples drawn from tax, see Bradley T. Borden,
Quantitative Model for Measuring Line-Drawing Inequity, 98 Iowa L. Rev. 971 (2013)
(describing how bifurcation can reduce the inequitable all-or-nothing treatment that stems
from a sharp line). More generally, see Larry Alexander, Scalar Properties, Binary
Judgments, 25 J. of Applied Phil. 85 (2008); Adam J. Kolber, Smooth and Bumpy Laws, 102
Cal. L. Rev. 655 (2014); Lee Anne Fennell, Slices and Lumps: Division and Aggregation in
Law and Life (2019). Of course, as we discuss below, the converse is also true: A sharp line
tends to be preferable if the objective underlying the policy is discontinuous at the location
where the line is drawn.
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where the line is drawn and less effective for taxpayers far from the
line.
We also consider the choice between sharp lines and sliding scales
from the perspective of the tax administrator. Each approach poses its
own enforcement challenges, which, as with the other considerations
we discuss, varies significantly by context. To illustrate, it may be that
a smaller share of tax returns report the correct tax liability under a
sliding scale, but that the magnitude of the reporting mistakes is larger
under a sharp line.
Finally, sliding scales and sharp lines differ in the degree to which
they induce taxpayers to engage in tax planning. Depending on the
setting, this difference can either exacerbate or alleviate the efficiency
costs of a tax. We describe how switching from a sharp line to a sliding
scale can alter both the costs and benefits of tax planning, with the net
effect varying from case to case. The net effect of tax planning on social
welfare is itself also ambiguous: Taxpayers are privately worse off from
failing to fully consider the tax when deciding on their behavior, but
society as a whole may benefit from more tax revenue or lower tax
rates.
Perhaps because the widespread use of sliding scales in tax has only
recently become practical, the policy choice between them and sharp
lines has not received much attention. For example, an influential set
of analyses studies the question of where to draw the (sharp) line that
divides two legal categories, but does not consider the antecedent
question of whether a sharp line is desirable in the first place.'
Similarly, the large literature that analyzes the choice between rules
and standards is focused on the precision with which a (sharp) line
between legal classifications is set out9 and does not consider the
desirability of a sliding scale.10
8 See David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing Doctrine and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84
Cornell L. Rev. 1627 (1999); David A. Weisbach, An Efficiency Analysis of Line Drawing
in the Tax Law, 29 J. Legal Stud. 71 (2000); see also Christian Gillitzer, Henrik Jacobsen
Kleven, and Joel Slemrod, A Characteristics Approach to Optimal Taxation: Line Drawing
and Tax-Driven Product Innovation, 119 Scand. J. of Econ. 240 (2017) (studying the optimal
placement of lines for differentially taxing commodities).
9 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L. J.
557 (1992); Frederick Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 645
(1991); see also Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 577
(1988).
10 In our nomenclature, both rules and standards are typically assumed to be sharp lines,
in that the consequence of crossing the line-whether its precise location is known or not-
results in a discontinuous change in legal treatment. In our analysis, we will mostly focus on
the choice between sharp line rules and sliding scale rules, but one can also imagine choosing
between sharp line standards and sliding scale standards, such as the choice between a pure
comparative negligence regime and a contributory negligence regime for tort liability. We
consider the special issues that arise for sliding scale and sharp line standards in Part VII.A.
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Notwithstanding the lack of a general treatment, others have
considered specific applications of our question, such as in discussions
about the taxation of hybrid financial instruments," the definition of a
capital asset,12 the distinction between debt and equity,13 and the
apportionment of tax liability across jurisdictions.14 Our hope is that
approaching the choice between sharp lines and sliding scales at a
higher level of abstraction will produce lessons that complement the
insights obtained in these specific domains.
Another related issue that has received attention is how tax liability
should vary by income, and in particular, the manner in which various
provisions should be subject to income phase-ins or phase-outs.15 Here,
the conventional wisdom is that sharp lines-or, "cliff effects" as
they're often referred to when tax liability depends on income-are
undesirable, and should be avoided whenever possible.16 Although we
don't focus on income-based classifications, a benefit of our framework
is that it is general enough to compare sliding scales and sharp lines in
both income and non-income settings. In the case of classifications
based on income, our results largely support the conventional view that
phase-ins are preferable to sharp lines. But for non-income
classifications, our analysis suggests that the proper approach can vary
across contexts.
Finally, outside of tax, prior work has noted the distinction between
sharp lines and sliding scales in diverse areas of law, 7 especially in the
11 See, e.g., Jeff Strnad, Taxing New Financial Products: A Conceptual Framework, 46
Stan. L. Rev. 569 (1994); David A. Weisbach, Tax Responses to Financial Contract
Innovation, 50 Tax L. Rev. 491, 496-502 (1995).
12 Bradley T. Borden, Nathan R. Brown & E. John Wagner II, A Case for Simpler Gain
Bifurcation for Real Estate Developers, 16 Fla. Tax Rev. 279, 291-300 (2014).
13 G. Mitu Gulati, William Klein & Eric Zolt, Connected Contracts, 47 UCLA L. Rev.
887 (2000).
14 See, e.g., Wolfgang Schon, International Tax Coordination for a Second-Best World
(Part I), World Tax J. 67, 90-99 (2009); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Kimberly A. Clausing &
Michael C. Durst, Allocating Business Profits for Tax Purposes: A Proposal to Adopt a
Formulary Profit Split, 9 Fla. Tax Rev. 497 (2009).
15 For an insightful discussion of this topic, see Manoj Viswanathan, The Hidden Costs of
Cliff Effects in the Internal Revenue Code, 164 U. Penn. L. Rev. 931 (2016). Although
Viswanathan's focus is on income-based cliff effects, he claims that "[c]liff effects in the
Internal Revenue Code based on metrics other than income can be reconciled with notions
of equity and efficiency." See id. at 954. We add nuance to that conclusion by highlighting
conditions in which sliding scales are actually preferable to sharp lines on both equity and
efficiency grounds, including for classifications based on characteristics other than income.
16 Id.; see also Joel Slemrod, Buenas Notches: Lines and Notches in Tax System Design,
11 eJournal Tax Res. 259, 275 (2013) (citing literature and arguing that in the absence of
administrative costs, a fully flexible optimal tax system would never have income-based
sharp lines).
17 See, e.g., John E. Coons, Approaches to Court Imposed Compromise-The Uses of
Doubt and Reason, 58 Nw. U. L. Rev. 750, 758-59 (1963) (focusing on courts imposing
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domains of tort and criminal law, 8 as well as in moral theory more
broadly.19 To our knowledge, however, we are the first to develop a
general framework for comparing the behavioral effects of sharp lines
and sliding scales. Indeed, our model can inform the choice between
these policies in tax and nontax settings alike.20
In the public finance literature, economists have studied the
behavioral effects of sharp lines and sliding scales, both as separate
instruments and more generally as a question of optimal taxation.21 As
with legal scholarship, the public finance literature tends to focus on
the properties of sharp lines, or "notches" as they're often referred to
in this field, in the context of how tax liability depends on income22
Separately, a large and growing empirical literature within economics
exploits policy notches to estimate various determinants of individual
behavior.23
The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows. Part I presents a
stylized model to compare the effects of sharp lines and sliding scales
on taxpayer behavior. Part II focuses on the efficiency trade-offs
between the two types of policies. Part III considers issues relating to
compromise outcomes in the case of a doctrinal or evidentiary tie); Gideon Parchomovsky,
Peter Siegelman & Steven Thel, Of Equal Wrongs and Half Rights, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 738
(2007); Lee Anne Fennell, Lumpy Property, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1955 (2012). For more
general treatments of this issue, see Leo Katz, Why the Law Is So Perverse 139-81 (2011)
(defending the existence of law's "either-or" treatment partly on the basis of social choice
theory); Kolber, note 7 (developing a taxonomy of the relationship between legal inputs and
outputs and considering the desirability of the various approaches across legal contexts,
including a brief discussion of tax law).
18 John Makdisi, Proportional Liability: A Comprehensive Rule to Apportion Tort
Damages Based on Probability, 67 N.C. L. Rev. 1063 (1989); Jeff L. Lewin, Comparative
Nuisance, 50 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1009 (1989); Saul Levmore, Probabilistic Recoveries,
Restitution, and Recurring Wrongs, 19 J. Legal Stud. 691 (1990); Douglas N. Husak, Partial
Defenses, 11 Can. J. of L. and Juris. 167 (1998); Michael Abramowicz, A Compromise
Approach to Compromise Verdicts, 89 Cal. L. Rev. 231 (2001); Henrik Lando, The Size of
the Sanction Should Depend on the Weight of the Evidence, 1 Rev. of L. and Econ. 277
(2005); Sonja B. Starr, Sentence Reduction as a Remedy for Prosecutorial Misconduct, 97
Geo. L.J. 1509 (2009); Adam J. Kolber, The Bumpiness of Criminal Law, 67 Ala. L. Rev.
855 (2016); Lee Anne Fennell, Accidents and Aggregates, 59 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2371
(2018).
19 Alexander, note 7; see also Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons 199-350 (1984)
(discussing the continuous nature of changes in personal identity over time).
20 Of course, the relevant normative considerations are likely to differ in nontax settings.
Unlike other areas of law, for example, taxes are typically designed to avoid affecting how
individuals behave.
21 The classic public finance article laying out the behavioral and efficiency trade-offs
between linear tax incentives and sharp lines is Alan S. Blinder & Harvey S. Rosen, Notches,
75 Am. Econ. Rev. 736 (1985). In Part II, we develop these principles in the context of the
classification challenges that frequently arise in tax law.
22 For a summary of this literature, as well as an exception to the focus on income-based
notches, see Slemrod, note 16.
23 For an overview, see Henrik Jacobsen Kleven, Bunching, 8 Ann. Rev. of Econ. 435
(2016).
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complexity. Part IV considers how well sharp lines and sliding scales
effectuate the policy goals underlying specific tax provisions. Part V
considers tax administration. Part VI considers implications for tax
planning. Part VII focuses on several special cases, relating to
standards versus rules; classifications based on taxpayer intent;
democratic legitimacy; classifications based on income; and multifactor
tests. Part VIII illustrates our analysis with examples relating to child
tax benefits, the capital gains holding period, conventions for
depreciable property placed in service, state residency tests, and the
treatment of debt versus equity instruments. Part IX concludes.
I. FRAMEWORK
This Part introduces a simple model of taxpayer behavior, discusses
its key assumptions, and considers the range of settings to which our
analysis applies.
A frequent task of legal doctrine is to classify situations into one
category or another, such as whether a party to a contract has breached
its obligation, whether some evidence is admissible into court, or
whether a defendant is guilty of a charged offense. In tax, such
classifications are used for the purpose of assigning tax liability to
taxpayers. If one thinks of the tax law as a function that maps
taxpayers' characteristics into tax liability, legal classifications
represent intermediate steps. Depending on how a taxpayer is
classified, both the amount of tax owed and the relation between tax
and income can differ. For example, a taxpayer classified as head of
household faces different tax rates than someone classified as single. A
business classified as a partnership faces a different tax regime than
one classified as an S corporation.
In reality, one's tax liability is a function of many characteristics-
such as age, marital status, and income amount and source.24 To keep
things simple, though, we'll generally restrict our focus to settings in
which tax liability varies based on a single characteristic (x), holding
fixed all of the other factors upon which tax liability depends. Because
x determines which legal category the taxpayer falls into, we refer to it
as the classification variable. We assume that x can take on values
between 0 and 1 (inclusive).
Our focus is on settings in which the tax law seeks to differentiate
taxpayers based on their value of x. In particular, we assume that the
law treats taxpayers with values of x at 0 differently from taxpayers
with values of x at 1. Thus, if we let t(x) denote tax liability as a
24 We use "characteristic" to denote any feature of taxpayers or their situations that could
potentially affect their tax liability.
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function of x, t(0) # t(1), where t(0) and t(1) denote liability under
the x = 0 and x = 1 tax regimes, respectively. Hence, x might represent
any characteristics of a taxpayer that can be represented using the zero-
to-one scale and for which the tax law distinguishes between taxpayers
falling at opposite ends of the continuum. For example, x might
represent he date during the year that taxpayers choose to get married
(0 represents January 1; 1 represents December 31 of a subsequent
calendar year); how long to hold a capital asset (0 represents selling
immediately after purchase; 1 might represent selling at ten years or
some point after25); or the extent to which a taxpayer is motivated by
profit to take some activity (0 represents no profit motive; 1 represents
complete profit motive). We set aside for now the question of why the
tax law seeks to treat these two groups of taxpayers differently, taking
this constraint as a given.
Depending on the setting, it may be that one tax regime is more
favorable for all taxpayers than the other, or it may be that the relative
desirability of the tax regimes differs among taxpayers. To keep things
simple, we focus on the case in which taxpayers prefer one tax regime
over the other by an identical amount, which we label r, r = t(1) -
t(0) > 0.
The question we seek to answer is how the tax law should treat
individuals with intermediate values of x: For any given x between 0
and 1, should the taxpayer be treated like taxpayers with x = 1, like
taxpayers with x = 0, or somewhere in between?
A sharp line is one way the law might assign tax liability to taxpayers
with intermediate values of x.26 Implementing a sharp line requires
selecting the value of x that will serve as the dividing point between
classification-we'll refer to this threshold as Y. The key feature of a
sharp line is its all-or-nothing nature: Taxpayers with a value of x on
the x = 1 side of z are treated as if they had x = 1; taxpayers with a
value of x on the x = 0 side of z are treated as if they had x = 0. Using
our notation, tax liability under a sharp line, ts, is given by:
25 For our purposes, it will not always be necessary to model each possible decision a
taxpayer might make as representing a distinct point between 0 and 1-for example, holding
periods of fifteen years and sixteen years might both be represented as x = 1. In choosing
which decisions can be modeled using the same value of x, the key assumption is that all
such decisions would receive the same tax treatment. Hence, for treatment of capital gains,
the endpoint of our scale should be chosen so that it corresponds to a date for which all
subsequent dates would be considered long-term.
26 What we refer to as a sharp line, others have referred to as a "bumpy" or "binary"
instrument. Alexander, note 7; Kolber, note 7. The unifying theme behind these concepts is
the discontinuous relationship between legal inputs (e.g., taxpayer characteristics) and legal
outputs (e.g., tax liability).
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tSL = t(0) + T I(x)
where I(x) is equal to 1 if x > x and equal to 0 if x ; Y. As noted above,
sharp lines govern many tax law definitions today.
The other approach we consider for differentiating between
taxpayers based on their value of x is a sliding scale. Under a sliding
scale, tax liability is determined by first computing liability under the
assumption that the x = 0 regime applies; then under the assumption
that the x = 1 regime applies; and finally, taking the weighted average
of liability under the two regimes based on the taxpayer's actual value
of x. Using the above notation, we can represent a taxpayer's liability
under a sliding scale, tss, as:27
tss = t(0) + TX
In contrast with a sharp line, tax liability under a sliding scale varies
continuously with the value of x selected.28
To illustrate the two approaches, consider a simple hypothetical
world where each person pays $500 per year as a head tax. The
legislature then implements a new policy designed to promote
homeownership by imposing a $2000 tax on those who rent their
housing. Thus t(0) is $500 and applies to those taxpayers who own a
home all year. And t(1) is $2500 for taxpayers who rent all year.
Suppose, however, a taxpayer begins a year renting a home but buys a
home later during the same year. How should the law treat taxpayers
when they rent for part of the year and own for part of the year? A
sharp line might classify taxpayers as "renters" for the year (and
increase their tax by the full $2000) if they rent for 183 days or more in
the year.29 In contrast, a sliding scale might impose tax in proportion to
the fraction of the year the taxpayer rents.30 Thus, someone who
27 Note that the sliding scale formula can be expressed as a weighted average of t(0) and
t(1), with weights given by x: ts" = t(1) x + t(0) (1 - x).
28 In theory, the distinction between sliding scales and sharp lines itself rests along a
continuum, in that the classification variable can be measured at differing levels of
granularity. For example, in the homeownership tax example described in the next
paragraph, a sliding scale version of the credit might be apportioned based on weeks of
homeownership, days, or even hours or minutes. We mostly abstract from such
considerations here but note that the optimal degree of granularity for a sliding scale likely
differs by setting, potentially balancing trade-offs between efficiency and complexity,
similar to the choice between a sliding scale and a sharp line.
29 So tSL = $500 + I(Rent) -$2,000, where I (Rent) is equal to 1 if the person rents for
183 days or more during the year, and 0 otherwise.
30 Formally tss = t(1) x + t(0) (1 - x) = $2,500 - (Fraction Renting) + $500 - (1 -
Fraction Renting).
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purchases a first home on March 15 (the 74th day of the year) and does
not sell it during the year would face a tax of:
\365) x ($2,000 + $500) + (1 - x ($0 + $500) = $905
These two possibilities-the 183-day sharp line and the sliding scale-
are illustrated in Figure 1.
FIGURE 1







Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between tax liability and days renting under sliding scale and
sharp line versions of a hypothetical renters tax.
So far, we have assumed that a sliding scale would transition
between the two tax regimes gradually over all intermediate values of
x. In some settings, there will be an advantage to transitioning between
the tax regimes over some but not all of the intermediate values. For
simplicity, we will refer to both of these approaches as sliding scales,
but it is worth noting that the smaller the set of values over which the
sliding scale transitions between tax regimes, the more it resembles a
sharp line.31
31 More generally, a sliding scale is just one example of a continuous function that
allocates tax liability based on x. In some settings, other (nonlinear) transition rules between
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Although many sharp lines can be converted into sliding scales,
some pose theoretical or practical challenges. However, some
provisions that initially appear difficult to smooth out turn out to be
conducive to a sliding scale design. Consider requirements that
taxpayers undertake some (discrete) activity once a particular
threshold is crossed. For example, most firms are required to issue
information returns on credit card payments to payees whose annual
credit card payments exceed $20,000. How might this $20,000 sharp line
be converted into a sliding scale? If a payee's transactions for the year
total $19,500, should the firm be required to report some but not all of
the covered payments? Or similarly, consider the provision requiring
employers with fifty or more employees to provide health insurance or
pay a penalty. Would a sliding scale require an employer with forty-
nine employees to provide partial health insurance (covering some
illnesses but not others)?
When the behavior required by a provision is difficult to smooth out
(as in the information reporting and health insurance examples), one
way to implement a sliding scale is to smooth out the consequences of
failing to take the action specified by the law.32 That is, rather than
phase in the requirement to provide health insurance, a sliding scale
version of the employer health insurance mandate might phase in the
fee for failing to provide insurance in proportion to the size of the
employer's workforce. The policy would then be recast: Firms with,
say, between forty and sixty workers would be required to either
provide insurance or pay a penalty-the amount of which would
gradually increase with the size of the employer's workforce. Thus, a
forty-nine-employee firm that opted against providing health
insurance would incur a penalty, but the magnitude of the penalty
would be slightly smaller than that owed by a fifty-one-employee firm
making the same decision. In principle, this approach could also work
in some settings where the consequence for noncompliance is
tax regimes may offer efficiency or other advantages. We limit our focus to sliding scales to
highlight the basic trade-offs between sharp lines and other approaches. With sufficient
flexibility, any tax function that is continuous in x can approximate a sharp line to an
arbitrary degree. For a discussion of continuity and linearity in a closely related setting, and
the limits to what a linear (i.e., sliding scale) type approach can achieve, see Jeff Strnad,
Taxing New Financial Products: A Conceptual Framework, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 569, 597-600
(1994).
32 One might instead say that the sliding scale version of the provision contains a penalty
for noncompliance, but this language is potentially misleading to the extent it suggests that
compliance is an all-or-nothing condition. Under a sliding scale, the tax incentive varies
based on the degree to which taxpayers conform their behavior to the objectives of the
statute. Hence, if the statute's objective is for large employers to provide health insurance
to their employees, the statute's goals are more frustrated-in this sense-when a fifty-one-
employee firm fails to provide coverage than when a forty-nine-employee firm fails to do
so.
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nonmonetary, so long as it is scalable. In criminal tax cases, for
example, one could scale a convicted taxpayer's prison sentence based
on the degree to which the law was violated (or other factors, such as
the taxpayer's culpability).33 On the other hand, a sliding scale is harder
to conceive of when the penalty for failing to satisfy the requirement
takes the form of a social sanction?3
Other parts of the tax law are less susceptible to a sliding scale
design. Broadly speaking, the challenges in implementing a sliding
scale arise either because the outcome tied to a classification does not
lend itself to being smoothed out or because the classification variable
itself is inherently binary.
First, consider settings where the outcome of a classification test
does not lend itself to being smoothed out. This issue arises
infrequently in tax, because most aspects of the tax law ultimately
affect tax liability, and tax liability is continuous and can be arbitrarily
scaled. In some cases, however, other tax-related outcomes do hinge
on classifications, and those can be more difficult to smooth. Certain
procedural requirements fall into this category. For example, the tax
court provides taxpayers with the option of arguing their tax deficiency
case under a simplified procedure if the total unpaid tax is less than
$50,000. It is difficult to imagine smoothing out this line: Would a
taxpayer alleged to owe $51,000 try the case twice, once under the
simplified rules and once under standard rules, and pay some average
of the judgments? Eligibility for tax assistance programs like the
Volunteer Income Tax Assistance program and Low-Income Taxpayer
Clinics raise similar considerations.35 To the extent that convictions for
criminal tax violations matter in themselves, apart from the
corresponding prison sentence or fine (which are continuous and
therefore can be smoothed out), they too illustrate a tax-related
outcome that is difficult to assign via a sliding scale.
33 Depending on the setting, a sliding scale could be implemented in criminal tax cases by
imposing a (relatively small) criminal penalty for levels of activity that are below the
threshold that would trigger a criminal conviction under current law, or the criminal penalty
could start phasing in at the current threshold for conviction. Of course, such factors may
already be considered in sentencing decisions. See Adam J. Kolber, The Bumpiness of
Criminal Law, 67 Ala. L. Rev. 855, 869-70 (2016). Note that this approach runs into difficulty
if a large part of the motivational force comes not from the specific sentence, but from the
discrete fact of violating the law or of conviction.
34 Ricardo Perez-Truglia and Ugo Troiano, Shaming Tax Delinquents,167 J. Pub. Econ.
120 (2018).
35 One probably undesirable approach for converting a sharp line to a sliding scale in such
cases would be to randomize outcomes, with the probability varying continuously in x. This
approach would approximate the efficiency properties of the sliding scale (at least in
expectation) but the complexity and horizontal equity properties of the sharp line. See our
discussion of uncertainty in Part II.F.
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In other cases, a sliding scale will be a poor fit because the variable
underlying a classification test is itself inherently binary. Consider a
corporate residency determination, for example; a corporation can
either charter in the United States or abroad. If a classification depends
solely on this factor, it is difficult to imagine how it could be smoothed
out, since the classification variable itself can take on values of only 0
or 1. Similarly, if a classification turns solely on whether a taxpayer
knowingly violated the law, implementing a sliding scale would require
differentiating between various degrees of "knowingly."
In practice, several factors limit the importance of this consideration.
First, although classifications that turn exclusively on a single binary
variable cannot be smoothed out, sliding scales can still be feasible
when multiple binary variables enter into a multifactor test-a
possibility we discuss in Part VII.F. Second, classifications that turn on
a binary classification variable are often motivated by goals that are
themselves nonbinary and amenable to a sliding scale. For example,
consider a classification that turns on whether a taxpayer is married.
Although legal marital status is binary, such provisions might actually
be motivated by considerations for which marital status serves as a
convenient proxy, such as financial interdependence or household size.
In such cases, one way to smooth out the classification is for the legal
test to incorporate one or more of these underlying factors rather than
focusing exclusively on formal marital status alone. Similarly, a
criminal tax provision that turns on whether a violation of the law was
knowing might be replaced by a sliding scale focusing on factors related
to culpability more generally.
In the Parts that follow, we consider a number of factors that shape
the relative merits between sharp lines and sliding scales.
II. EFFICIENCY CONSIDERATIONS
This Part compares the efficiency properties of sharp lines and
sliding scales. In the cases we consider, we find that sliding scales tend
to be more efficient than sharp lines. However, we also identify
situations when sharp lines are in fact more efficient. This occurs
when-absent taxes-few taxpayers would locate near the sharp line.
The magnitude of the difference in efficiency between sharp lines and
sliding scales depends in part on the difficulty or ease with which
taxpayers can adjust their behavior on account of the tax and on how
directly taxpayers can control the factors that determine their tax
liability.
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A. Model of Taxpayer Behavior
To compare the efficiency of sharp lines and sliding scales, consider
a classification variable x over which taxpayers have at least some
control. The level of control that taxpayers exert over x may be
complete, such as the date in the year the taxpayer gets married, or
imperfect, such as the date in the year that a child is born. If x is entirely
outside of the taxpayer's control, efficiency considerations can safely
be set aside (at least with respect to distorting the taxpayer's behavior
relating to x). For simplicity, we will initially focus on the case in which
taxpayers have complete control over their value of x.36
To model how taxpayers select x, we impose two assumptions about
taxpayer behavior. First, we assume that absent tax considerations,
taxpayers have some ideal value of x they would like to select, which
we label xi (the subscript i denotes the taxpayer). All else being equal,
taxpayers prefer to select values of x that are as close as possible to
their ideal point.37
Second, we assume the incremental cost of locating farther from
one's ideal point grows larger as the distance from the ideal point
increases. "Convex adjustment costs" of this form are commonly
imposed in economic analyses.38 To illustrate, consider taxpayers
seeking to reduce the number of days they spend in a high-tax state.
39
Taxpayers might look at their calendars to identify all the days they
had planned to spend in the state; some plans that would take them
into the state might be easy to cancel or move to a different location.
These would be the first to go. Further reductions would require
costlier adjustments to their behavior-perhaps a meeting could be
rescheduled but only at substantial inconvenience. And some
adjustments-such as switching jobs to work for an employer in a
different state or ceasing to visit a family member who lives in the high
tax jurisdiction-would be so costly that the tax consequences would
be unlikely to justify them.
40
36 We explore the case in which taxpayers imperfectly control x in Part II.G.
37 The magnitude of the cost to locating away from one's ideal point may vary based on
the time horizon being considered. Short-term adjustment costs may exceed long-term ones,
for example.
38 See, e.g., Shane Singh, Linear and Quadratic Utility Loss Functions in Voting Behavior
Research, 26 J. of Theoretical Pol. 35 (2014) (discussing this issue in one setting).
39 For a vivid illustration of this point, see James B. Stewart, Tax Me If You Can, The
New Yorker, Mar. 12, 2012 (discussing taxpayers seeking to avoid New York City
residence).
40 As a different example, consider a taxpayer holding a capital asset that she would prefer
to sell but continues to hold in order to obtain long-term capital gains treatment. If the
taxpayer would, absent taxes, sell stock A and buy stock B because she believes B will
outperform A, the gap in future expected profits would compound with each additional day
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Absent tax considerations, individuals would locate at their ideal
point, x7. After taxes are introduced, taxpayers balance the desire to
locate near their ideal points with the desire to minimize tax liability.
As we will see, the specific values of x that taxpayers choose, as well as
the tax's deadweight loss, will depend on which form of rule the law
adopts.
B. Behavioral Effects of a Sharp Line
We first consider the behavioral effects of imposing a sharp line rule,
with cutoff point x.41 To illustrate how this type of rule affects behavior,
we will examine how four different taxpayers would respond. The
taxpayers are identical to one another except for their ideal points, as
indicated in Figure 2.
Consider first taxpayer A, whose ideal point is denoted by x.
Because xA x, choosing her ideal point results in A being taxed under
the favorable tax regime and yields tax liability equal to t(0). Because
there is no way for A to reduce her liability by adjusting her choice of
x, she will select her ideal point, xA = x. The same logic holds for other
taxpayers with ideal points between 0 and x.
Next consider taxpayer B, whose ideal point is just to the right of x.
Absent tax considerations, B would also select his ideal point. But
because a small reduction in x yields substantial tax advantages, B will
find it worthwhile to choose xB = x instead of xg. Intuitively, B is worse
off for choosing to locate away from his ideal point, but incurring this
cost is worth it for him because locating at the cutoff allows B to remain
close to his ideal point while also allowing him to significantly reduce
his tax liability. Note that B would never choose xB < x because he can
achieve all of the tax benefits by moving to x, and any point to the left
of x would be farther from his ideal point.
of delay, leading to a convex cost function for continuing to hold A. The same is true if the
taxpayer would, absent taxes, sell A to better diversify her portfolio; this cost would also
compound. See Ian Ayres & Edward Fox, Alpha Duties: The Search for Excess Returns
and Appropriate Fiduciary Duties, 97 Tex. L. Rev. 445, 453-65 (2019) (discussing the trade-
off between capital gains taxes and the costs of under-diversification). As yet another
example, businesses are often hought to face convex costs when they adjust their capital by
putting depreciable capital in place. See Fumio Hayashi, Tobin's Marginal q and Average
q: A Neoclassical Interpretation, 50 Econometrica 213 (1982); see also Russell W. Cooper
& John C. Haltiwanger, On the Nature of Capital Adjustment Costs, 73 Rev. Econ. Stud.
611 (2006) (finding empirical evidence of both non-convex and convex costs for businesses
adjusting capital).
41 For a related analysis in a somewhat different setup, see Susan Morse, Safe Harbors,
Sure Shipwrecks, 49 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1385 (2016) (describing the effects on taxpayer
behavior induced by safe harbors and their opposite, sure shipwrecks).
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FIGURE 2
BEHAVIORAL EFFECTS OF A SHARP LINE
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Figure 2 illustrates the incentive effects generated by a sharp line for taxpayers with varying ideal
values of the classification variable.
Next consider taxpayer C, who, like B, has an ideal point to the right
of x, but whose ideal point is farther from Y. For C to change her
behavior because of the tax, it must be that her ideal point is close
enough to the cutoff that switching to x to achieve the tax savings is
worth the sacrifice in terms of selecting a value of xc away from x .
Suppose that C does find it worthwhile to change her behavior in this
way. Like B, C will choose to locate exactly at x, since moving farther
to the left would cause her to be farther from her ideal point and would
yield no additional tax savings. Note that, all else being equal, C is
worse off than B because although both are taxed under the preferable
regime, C is farther from her ideal point.
Finally, consider taxpayer D, whose ideal point is to the right of both
xe and x. Like B and C, tax considerations would motivate D to select
xD = x, but the utility cost of doing so would be greater than for B or
C, since xo is even farther from Y. Assuming that the utility cost from
moving to x exceeds the tax reduction that D would achieve from doing
so, D will remain at xo. Note that there is no benefit to D from moving
any closer to x while still remaining to the right of it, since doing so
would not reduce his tax liability.
To summarize the effect of the sharp line on taxpayers' behavior, we
can divide taxpayers into three categories, based on their ideal points.
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Someone whose ideal point is to the left of x will choose xi = x.
Someone whose ideal point is slightly to the right of x will choose xi =
Y. And someone whose ideal point is sufficiently to the right of x will
choose xi = x. Thus, under a sharp line, some taxpayers adjust their
choice of x because of the tax, while others do not. Those who adjust
their behavior select Y. Those who do not adjust their behavior select
their ideal points.
C. Efficiency Properties of a Sharp Line
What are the efficiency costs of the sharp line? After adjusting their
behavior in response to the tax, A, B, and C each pay a tax of t(0), and
D pays a tax of t(0) + T. The deadweight loss of a tax is equal to the
amount by which it reduces taxpayer welfare over and above the
revenue it collects. Here, taxpayers are worse off by the amount of tax
they pay. In addition, those taxpayers who adjust their choice of x
because of the tax are worse off because they are no longer at their
ideal point. In Figure 2, therefore, taxpayers B and C are the ones who
generate deadweight loss. Taxpayer B generates only a little
deadweight loss because x (where B ends up) is close to x*. Taxpayer
C generates more deadweight loss than B, because the value of x she
ends up choosing (x) is farther from her ideal point. Taxpayers A and
D generate no deadweight loss because they are worse off only from
the tax revenue they transfer to the government. Thus, the more
taxpayers there are near B, and especially the more taxpayers there are
near C, the larger the deadweight loss generated by the sharp line.42
We illustrate the efficiency consequences of a sharp line in Figure 3,
which simulates the deadweight loss (as a percentage of revenue
collected) generated as a function of a taxpayer's ideal point.43 In our
analyses, we assume that the sharp line threshold is set to x = 0.5.44 As
suggested by our discussion above, the simulation results reflect he
42 Note that the magnitude of the deadweight loss is shaped in part by the costs to
taxpayers of deviating from their ideal points, since such costs determine how many
taxpayers behave like C versus D in the prior example. In the extreme case, where the costs
of deviating from one's ideal point are so great that taxpayers never choose to adjust their
behavior in response to the tax, there is no deadweight loss.
43 The simulation assumes that taxpayers face quadratic loss from adjusting their behavior
away from their ideal point and linear disutility from paying tax: Ui = -a(xt - x)2 - t(xi).
The analysis reported in Figure 3 assumes a = 3, but we obtain qualitatively similar results
for a E 0.5, 1,5,10). The deadweight loss generated by taxpayers with a given value of x*
corresponds to the additional revenue the government could raise from such taxpayers
under a lump-sum tax without making the taxpayer worse off than under the distortive tax.
44 A more fulsome analysis of this issue would need to account for the underlying
rationale for differentially classifying taxpayers by x; this is because setting x = 1 would
eliminate all deadweight loss arising from the classification, at the cost of eliminating the
classification in the first place.
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fact that no deadweight loss is generated by taxpayers with ideal points
below the line or taxpayers with ideal points sufficiently above the line
that their behavior is not affected by the tax. In contrast, the sharp line
induces taxpayers with ideal points slightly to the right of the line
(between 0.5 and 0.65 in our simulation) to select x = Y. Within this
range, the farther from the line a taxpayer's ideal point is, the more
deadweight loss the taxpayer's behavior generates.
FIGURE 3
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Figure 3 shows the contribution to deadweight loss of taxpayers with varying ideal values of the
classification variable under a sharp line. The results are derived from the simulation exercise
described in the text.
D. Behavioral Effects of a Sliding Scale
Now consider the behavioral effects of a sliding scale, as illustrated
in Figure 4. As in Figure 2, Taxpayers A, B, C, and D are drawn based
on the location of their ideal points. First, consider taxpayer A. Under
the sharp line, A faced no tax incentive to choose a value of x other
than her ideal point. Under the sliding scale, if A reduces xA below xA,
she will reduce her tax liability as well. However, if she chooses too low
a value of x, the disutility from locating away from her ideal point will
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some value of x that is less than xA, but she would generally not reduce
her choice of x all the way to 0.45
FIGURE 4






Figure 4 illustrates the incentive effects generated by a sliding scale for taxpayers with varying
ideal values of the classification variable.
The analysis is the same for taxpayers B, C, and D. As long as the
cost of diverging from one's ideal point is the same for all taxpayers,
the tax will cause all taxpayers to reduce their x in a similar manner.46
For a taxpayer like B (i.e., one whose ideal point is sufficiently close to
the line), the reduction in x induced by the sliding scale will be similar
to or can even exceed the reduction in x induced by the sharp line; this
is because such a taxpayer would adjust her behavior by only a very
small amount in response to the sharp line but would adjust her
behavior in the same manner as everyone else in response to the sliding
scale. In contrast, taxpayers like C would select a value of x farther
45 This follows from the assumption that the marginal disutility of locating farther away
from one's ideal point increases in the distance from the ideal point. Someone with an ideal
point close enough to 0 would select x = 0, simply because x cannot be reduced below that
amount.
46 The precise response depends on taxpayers' utility functions. Under the utility function
assumed in the simulations, for example, taxpayers reduce x by a uniform amount.






from their ideal point under the sharp line than under the sliding scale
because the potential tax savings from moving to x, and enjoying the
full savings of the low-tax regime, are more than the potential savings
from moving to a lower value of x under the sliding scale.
E. Efficiency Properties of the Sliding Scale
Figure 5 illustrates the deadweight loss under a sliding scale using
the simulation that generated Figure 3. Because all the taxpayers A, B,
C, and D adjust their behavior by the same amount, they each generate
the same deadweight loss.47 As with the sharp line, the magnitude of
the deadweight loss associated with the sliding scale depends on the
cost to taxpayers of deviating from their ideal points, relative to the tax
benefits. When doing so is prohibitively expensive, sliding scales (like
sharp lines) do not generate much deadweight loss.
47 Taxpayers with ideal points sufficiently close to 0 will simply move to 0. Consequently,
these taxpayers tend to generate less deadweight loss than others who are not limited in the
amount they can adjust their behavior in response to the tax. This is not reflected in Figure
4 because our smallest displayed point (xi = 0.01) is not small enough for such taxpayers
to want to move all the way to 0 under the utility function we assume.
256 [Vol. 73:TAX LAW REVIEW
SHARP LINES AND SLIDING SCALES IN TAX LAW
FIGURE 5
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Figure 5 shows the contribution to deadweight loss of taxpayers with varying ideal values of the
classification variable under a sliding scale. The results are derived from the simulation exercise
described in the text.
F. Comparing the Efficiency of a Sharp Line and Sliding Scale
Assessing the relative efficiency of a sharp line and sliding scale
requires determining whether the deadweight loss from the change in
behavior of taxpayers like B and C under the sharp line exceeds the
deadweight loss from the change in behavior of all taxpayers under the
sliding scale.48 On the one hand, more taxpayers change their behavior
under the sliding scale, and hence generate at least some deadweight
loss. On the other hand, because the sharp line induces larger changes
in behavior for those taxpayers who do respond to it, the overall
magnitude of the deadweight loss can be larger in that case.
The question is therefore whether there are relatively more
taxpayers like C (who favor the sliding scale) or relatively more
taxpayers like A and D (who favor the sharp line). The presence of
taxpayers like B-who adjust their behavior modestly in response to
48 In comparing the deadweight loss generated under the two policies, we hold fixed the
amount of revenue raised by the tax.
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both the sharp line and the sliding scale -has an approximately neutral
effect, since both of these changes are of roughly equal magnitude.4 9
To illustrate this point in more detail, we draw on a simulation
exercise50 to explore the following three possibilities for how taxpayers'
ideal points are distributed between 0 and 1:
(1) x* is evenly distributed across each value between 0 and 1;
(2) x* is distributed according to a bell curve, with a peak at x; or
(3) x* has a bimodal distribution, with most ideal points
concentrated near 0 and 1.
FIGURE 6
POTENTIAL DISTRIBUTIONS OF TAXPAYER IDEAL POINTS
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00 1 00 1 °0 1
x** Xi* X,*
Our first result is that when ideal types are evenly distributed across
each value of x, a sliding scale tends to be more efficient than a sharp
line.51 The intuition for this result is that although the sliding scale
causes more people to change their behavior than the sharp line, the
magnitude of the adjustments under the former is smaller than the
magnitude of the adjustments under the latter. Because of the
49 The analysis thus far assumes that taxpayers fully consider both sharp lines and sliding
scales when determining their behavior. Depending on the magnitude of the taxes,
taxpayers may not account for the two designs equally, which can affect the way they shape
taxpayer behavior. We discuss such issues in Part VI.
50 As with the simulations reported in Figures 3 and 5, we assume taxpayer utility is quasi-
linear in taxes and quadratic in loss from distance to one's ideal point, Ui = -a(xi - x,*)2 _
t(xi). The simulations adopt the following procedure. First, we select a tax rate rss and
compute the amount of tax revenue generated by that rss under the sliding scale (R), where
R = f, rss xi. Second, we compute the tax amount rsL that generates R under the sharp line.
Third, we compare the deadweight loss generated by the sliding scale with rate rss to the
sharp line with tax amount -IsL. Throughout, we assume the sharp line is placed so that X =
0.5. The simulations presented in the body of the paper assume rss = 0.05 and a = 3, but
we obtain qualitatively similar results for r E {0.005, 0.01, 0.03, 0.05, 0.07, 0.1} and a E
{0.5, 1,3,5,10}.
51 More precisely, our claim is that a sliding scale is more efficient than a sharp line for
the case in which taxpayers' ideal points are uniformly distributed and the loss from
deviating from one's ideal point is quadratic. A proof of this result is contained in the
Appendix.
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convexity of adjustment costs-that is, the idea that incremental
deviations away from one's ideal point generate more disutility the
farther away from the ideal point one starts out-those taxpayers who
change their behavior by a lot in response to the sharp line generate
much more deadweight loss than those taxpayers who adjust their
behavior by a little in response to the sliding scale. Using the language
of our previous example, although there are more A's and D's than C's
when there is a uniform distribution of ideal points, this ratio-of
(A+D) to C-is not large enough to account for how much extra dead-
weight loss each C adds.2 Our simulation analysis illustrates this result
in the first panel of Figure 7.
Likewise, if taxpayers' ideal points follow a normal distribution
around the threshold (x), the efficiency advantage of the sliding scale
is even greater. Intuitively, the normal distribution guarantees that
more taxpayers are like C, whose ideal points are just close enough to
the threshold to be willing to adjust their choice of x by a substantial
amount in response to the tax.
FIGURE 7
DEADWEIGHT LOSS BY TAXPAYER IDEAL POINT DISTRIBUTION
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Figure 7 compares deadweight loss for a sharp line and sliding scale under varying assumptions
about the distribution of taxpayer ideal values of the classification variable. The results are
displayed as a percentage of the deadweight loss generated by the sharp line and derived from
the simulation exercise described in the text.
Last, if the x's have a bimodal distribution, and are concentrated
around 0 or 1, the sharp line can be more efficient. The reason why is
that this distribution ensures that not many taxpayers have ideal points
near the threshold, reducing the amount of deadweight loss the sharp
line generates. In the language of our earlier illustration, the bimodal
distribution guarantees that there are relatively few taxpayers in
categories B or C, which limits the deadweight loss generated by the
sharp line. More generally, this example highlights that if there is a
"dip" in the distribution of taxpayer ideal points, such that the line can
52 In contrast, if the disutility from deviating from one's ideal point was linear, rather than
convex, the relative efficiency of the two policy types would depend simply on which
induced a larger total change in taxpayer behavior, regardless of whether individual
taxpayers changed their behavior by a lot or a little.
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be drawn in a way that will not distort most taxpayers' behavior, a sharp
line can be more efficient than a sliding scale.
Given that the efficient choice between sharp lines and sliding scales
depends on the distribution of taxpayers' ideal types, a reasonable
question to ask is how might a policymaker learn about the distribution
of ideal types in any practical application? The key question is whether
the distribution contains a sufficiently large "dip" so that a sharp line
could be drawn in a relatively non-distorting manner.
In cases in which there is no relevant existing tax, policymakers can
examine the distribution of ideal points directly. For example, the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) taxed long-term capital gains at the same
rate as ordinary income, eliminating the incentive to hold assets for just
over a year to obtain a more favorable rate.5 3 Thus, data on how long
taxpayers held capital assets in the wake of TRA86 would reveal
taxpayers' ideal distribution of holding periods (x*) during that period.
If the tax in question already exists, estimating x* is more difficult,
but usually feasible (at least with sufficiently strong assumptions). One
option is to look at the behavior of groups exempted from the tax, if
there are any.54 Often, however, policymakers will need to look to data
on actual choices made subject to the tax and attempt to back out the
distribution of x*. As described above, if the tax is a sharp line, its
effects on behavior take the form of inducing a dip in the distribution
just on the tax-disfavored side of the line. If the observed distribution
does not have any other dips, therefore, this implies that x* likely does
not contain a dip.55
To illustrate, consider Figure 8, which shows the distribution of
taxpayers' holding periods of capital assets (with gains).56 The solid line
is the actual holding period data. As predicted by the theory, the figure
shows a spike in sales just after the one-year holding period threshold
needed to obtain the lower capital gains rate, and disproportionately
few sales just prior to the one-year mark. The lack of any other
substantial dip in the distribution suggests that the distribution of
53 See Roberton Williams, Tax Rates on Capital Gains, Tax Notes, Jan. 9, 2012.
9 For example, with data on actual capital asset holding periods, one could look at
exempt entities like universities, charities, pension funds, or assets in 401(k) funds. The
difficulty with this method is extrapolating from the tax-exempt group to the whole
population.
ss When the observable distribution of x comes from decisions made under a sliding scale,
backing out the underlying distribution of x' typically requires more assumptions. If we
assume, as the model does in Part I, that all taxpayers respond to the tax in a uniform
fashion, then we can conclude from the absence of dips in the observable distribution of x
that x* lacks a dip as well (or vice versa if the observed x's have a dip, so do the x*'s).
56 Timothy Dowd & Robert McClelland, Urban-Brookings Tax Pol'y Ctr., The Bunching
of Capital Gains Realizations (2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2899093.
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taxpayers' ideal holding periods (x*), which we approximate with a
dashed line in Figure 8, is relatively smooth.57
FIGURE 8
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Note: The horizontal axis is the number of weeks before and after the one-year holding period.
Source: Dowd & McClelland, note 53 (using data from the Statistics of Income from 2016).
Finally, in addition to knowing whether a sharp line or sliding scale
is more efficient in a particular context, it is also important to know
how much more efficient one approach is than the other, especially in
cases where the more efficient approach is less desirable on other
grounds, such as complexity. As indicated in the above discussions, the
deadweight loss generated by both a sharp line and sliding scale
depends not only on how much taxpayers adjust their behavior in
response to the tax, but also on how costly it is for them to do so. Thus,
in settings in which it is relatively costless for taxpayers to choose
values of x that are far from their ideal points, the deadweight loss
generated by either the sharp line or the sliding scale will tend to be
small. In contrast, when it is costly for taxpayers to adjust their
behavior, but the incentives generated by the tax instrument are strong
enough that taxpayers still do so, the amount of deadweight loss will be
57 To be clear, our estimate of x* here is an approximate one based only on visual
inspection of the data. A more sophisticated analysis would model x* by formally estimating
the size of the discontinuity at the one-year threshold and then assigning the "excess" sales
that occur just after the one-year threshold to an x* earlier in time.
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larger, and hence, the efficiency differences between sliding scales and
sharp lines will be more important as well.
G. Uncertainty
Thus far, we have assumed that a taxpayer's liability is a
deterministic (i.e., nonrandom) function of her choice of x. In some
settings, a taxpayer's liability might remain uncertain even after she
selects x. This might occur, for example, if the tax authority observes x
only imperfectly, as when tax liability turns on whether a taxpayer's
primary purpose in incurring an expense was business or personal. In
other cases, uncertainty might arise because the applicable law takes
the form of a standard rather than a rule, in which tax liability is
determined by applying some general, non-dispositive principle to the
situation at hand, such as whether an employer-provided meal is
incurred "for the convenience of the employer" or whether a particular
transaction will be characterized as a "sham." In such cases, taxpayers
may be uncertain as to the tax liability they will face based on their
choice of x.51
To apply our model to such settings, suppose the tax authority
observes the value of the classification variable that the taxpayer
selects with error. Using the notation of the model, the taxpayer
continues to select x, but tax liability under the sharp line and sliding
scale each depend on z, where i = x + E, and where e is a normally
distributed error term with mean zero:
Sharp Line: tSL = t(0) + r I(z)
Sliding Scale: tss = t(0) +,r x
Altering the model in this way reveals that uncertainty tends to
reduce the magnitude of the efficiency differences between sliding
scales and sharp lines. The reason why is that the uncertainty between
a taxpayer's choice of x and ultimate tax liability effectively smooths
out the taxpayer's expected tax liability as a function of x, making the
taxpayer's incentives under the sharp line resemble those faced under
a sliding scale.59 With uncertainty, a taxpayer who selects a value of x
just below the line may still be treated by the tax authority as having
58 A different form of uncertainty, which we do not consider here, is when taxpayers have
imperfect control over x-for example, when x is uncertain given the taxpayer's behavior.
This form of uncertainty enters the model differently because it creates uncertainty in
taxpayers' direct utility from x in addition to their tax liability.
59 Although uncertainty makes the instruments more similar in expectation, risk-averse
taxpayers may prefer sliding scales in the presence of uncertainty because sliding scales
reduce the variance of realized tax liability relative to sharp lines.
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selected a value of x that is above the line. Conversely, a taxpayer who
selects a value of x just above the line may end up being treated by the
tax authority as having selected a value of x that is below the line. Thus,
uncertainty reduces taxpayers' incentives to make drastic changes to
their behavior to locate on the tax-minimizing side of a sharp line.60
Figure 9 illustrates expected tax liability as a function of x under
both a sharp line and a sliding scale in the presence of uncertainty. The
greater the uncertainty (i.e., the larger the standard deviation in the
distribution of E), the more the expected tax liability schedule for the
sharp line resembles that of the sliding scale, and hence, the smaller the
efficiency differences between the policies will be. Thus, in Figure 9 in
the left-hand panel, when the standard deviation of E is small, the sharp
line regime continues to look roughly similar to the situation without
uncertainty, but with some smoothing out of expected liability around
the threshold. By contrast, when the degree of uncertainty is large; the
sharp line regime more closely resembles the sliding scale (Figure 9
right-hand panel).61
The simulation analysis presented in Figure 10 compares sharp lines
and sliding scales in the case in which xi is uniformly distributed, first
without uncertainty and then in the presence of different levels of
uncertainty.62 As illustrated in the figure, the sliding scale continues to
generate less deadweight loss relative to the sharp line in the presence
of uncertainty, but the efficiency properties of the two instruments are
more similar than when no uncertainty is present.
Thus, whether for good or bad, the efficiency differences between
sharp lines and sliding scales are less pronounced when there is more
uncertainty between taxpayers' decisions and their ultimate tax
60 This point is related to the classic result that legal uncertainty has an ambiguous effect
on a deterrence policy's behavioral effects. John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some
Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 Va. L. Rev. 965, 965-67
(1984); John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2
J.L. Econ. & Org. 279, 279-80 (1986). The similarity is due to the fact that uncertainty
converts a sharp line into an instrument with similar incentive properties as a sliding scale
(at least in expectation). See Emily Cauble, Safe Harbors in Tax Law, 47 Conn. L. Rev.
1385, 1420 (2015), (comparing the distortive effects of a safe harbor-that is, a sharp line
rule-with an uncertain standard, that is, an instrument that generates similar incentives to
a sliding scale); Alex Raskolnikov, Probabilistic Compliance, 34 Yale J. on Reg. 491 (2017)
(studying how uncertainty affects decisions by the taxpayer about efforts to ensure
compliance with a legal standard). Some of these points also arise in David Weisbach's
comparison of (sharp line) rules and standards. See David Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax
Law, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 860,872-75 (1999).
61 The sliding scale in Figure 9 is no longer exactly a straight line because around 0 errors
can only push up x, resulting in slightly higher expected tax liability for taxpayers choosing
x = 0 than in the case without uncertainty. The reverse is true around 1: Errors can only
push down x.
62 The simulation imposes the same assumptions about taxpayer utility functions as in the
simulations described above.
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liability. In the remainder of the Article, we consider how the choice
between sharp lines and sliding scales affects tax policy considerations
apart from efficiency.
FIGURE 9
EXPECTED TAX LIABILITY UNDER A SHARP LINE AND SLIDING SCALE
WITH UNCERTAINTY
Some Uncertainty Lots of Uncertainty
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Figure 9 shows expected tax liability as a function of the classification variable under a sliding
scale and a sharp line. The left panel assumes a standard deviation of the noise term of 0.05; the
right panel assumes a standard deviation of the noise term of 0.2.
FIGURE 10
RELATIVE DEADWEIGHT LOSS BY LEVEL OF UNCERTAINTY
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Figure 10 shows the deadweight loss generated by a sliding scale relative to the deadweight loss
generated by a sharp line at varying levels of uncertainty. The results are derived from a
SHARP LINES AND SLIDING SCALES IN TAX LAW
simulation exercise, described in the text. The left column assumes no uncertainty. The second-
to-left column assumes a standard deviation of 0.05 for the noise term. The second-to-right
column assumes a standard deviation of 0.2 for the noise term. The right column shows
deadweight loss generated from a sharp line as a reference. Note that the right column is
mechanically equal to 100, regardless of the level of uncertainty.
III. COMPLEXITY CONSIDERATIONS
In addition to differing in the way they affect taxpayer behavior,
sliding scales and sharp lines can differ greatly in their complexity. A
particular test for classifying taxpayers may be complex in some
dimensions and simple in others.63 In this Part, we consider both the
computational and informational complexity of sliding scales and sharp
lines, and the implications of each for the complexity of tax filing and
tax planning.64
Our main conclusion is that sliding scales can complicate the tax
filing process relative to sharp lines, but the difference in complexity
between the instrument types differs greatly by setting. Our conclusion
is similarly nuanced with respect to tax planning: Sliding scales are
more complex in some dimensions and less complex in others. Below,
we outline the main considerations that determine which approach is
more complex in a particular context.
A. Computational Complexity
Computational complexity refers to the complexity of determining
an individual's tax liability given all of the relevant information about
the individual (e.g., income, family size, etc.). It is easy to see that
sliding scales are more computationally complex than sharp lines.
Under a sharp line, taxpayers determine their liability by first
determining which tax regime applies, and second, calculating their
liability under that regime. Implementing the first step simply requires
assessing whether the classification variable (x) is above or below the
threshold Y. Under a sliding scale, in contrast, taxpayers must compute
their tax liability under both regimes, and then take a weighted average
of the two resulting liabilities based on x. For most people, calculating
a weighted average based on x will be more difficult than comparing x
63 See David F. Bradford, Untangling the Income Tax, 266-67 (1986).
64 For an extended discussion of computational versus informational complexity, see
Jacob Goldin, Tax Benefit Complexity and Take-Up: Lessons from the Earned Income Tax
Credit, 72 Tax L. Rev. 59 (2018).
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to x, and it is obviously more work to calculate one's liability under two
different tax regimes than under one.65
To illustrate, consider the choice of rules for whether taxpayers can
claim a child on their return, based on the child's birth date. Under a
sharp line, taxpayers simply determine whether the child's birth date
falls before or after the cutoff, and then calculate liability once, either
claiming or not claiming the child based on when the child was born.
Under a sliding scale, taxpayers would calculate their liability twice,
once assuming they claim the child and once assuming they do not, and
then take a weighted average of the two results based on the date the
child was born. The sliding scale calculation is more complicated, since
it requires calculating liability twice, and entails the additional step of
taking the weighted average.
In some cases, the computational complexity of a sliding scale is
more extreme. For example, the choice of applicable tax regime may
have implications not only for determining the tax consequences of a
particular transaction, but also of subsequent ransactions or events.
One example is the 80% control requirement for § 351 exchanges in
corporate taxation. Smoothing out the test for a nonrecognition
provision of this form has implications not only for the transaction itself
(i.e., how much gain or loss is recognized), but also for subsequent
transactions that depend on the corporation's basis of the contributed
property or the taxpayer's basis in the received stock.
The additional computational complexity from smoothing out a
sharp line may be even more extreme than in the prior example in
settings where the outcome of the test determines which of two very
different tax regimes applies. To illustrate, consider the hundred-
65 In some cases, sliding scales can be designed to avoid requiring taxpayers to compute
their entire tax liability twice, such as when the outcome of the sliding scale is the share of
an expense the taxpayer is permitted to deduct.
At the other extreme, with multiple sliding scale rules in place, the number of calculations
a taxpayer must perform can increase exponentially. For example, suppose that both marital
status (M) and state residency (R) enter into a sliding scale classification based on when in
the year those events occurred. In this case, the taxpayer must calculate tax liability under
four scenarios: married resident (M = 1, R = 1), married nonresident (M = 1, R = 0), single
resident (M = 0, R = 1), and single nonresident (M = 0, R = 0). Tax liability is a function of
both M, and R, t(M, R). Tax liability under a sliding scale is then given by:
t" = t(0,0) + XM [t(1,0) - t(0,0)] + XR (0,1) - t(0,0)1 + XMR [t(1,1) - 01,0) -
t(0,1) + t(0,0)]
where XM, XR, and XMR respectively denote the share of days during the year that the
taxpayer was married, living in the state, and married while living in the state. Note that
when the tax consequences of marriage and state residency are independent, the last term
of this equation is equal to 0. Equivalently, we can express this formula as a weighted
average, based on the share of the year the taxpayer falls into each of the four marital status
by residency categories:
tss = (1 - xM - XR + XMR)t(0,0) + t(1,0)(XM - XMR) + t(0,1)(XR - XMR) + t(1,1)xMR
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shareholder limitation for S corporations.66 In theory, one might
smooth this requirement out as follows: Over some range of
shareholders, say from 90 to 110, the entity would be taxed partly under
subchapter C and partly under subchapter S. For example, if the entity
had 95 shareholders, it could be taxed 75% as an S corporation and
25% as a C corporation. How might this be implemented? One option
would be to pretend there were in fact two corporations, an S
corporation that earned 75% of the income (and incurred 75% of the
expenses, etc.), and a C corporation that earned 25% of the income.
This approach would smooth out the shareholder requirement, but
would generate substantial computational complexity for taxpayers-
who would have to compute taxes under two entirely different
regimes.67 A different example that illustrates a similar challenge
relates to the qualifications for tax-exempt entity status, such as the
requirement that a § 501(c)(4) entity not be engaged primarily in
political activity. In theory, these tests can be smoothed out, but the
computational complexity that doing so would cause is likely not worth
the effort.
B. Informational Complexity
Informational complexity refers to the difficulty in obtaining the
information upon which the determination of one's tax liability
depends. As with computational complexity, a sliding scale tends to be
more informationally complex than a sharp line. There are two reasons
for this. First, a sliding scale requires more granular information on the
classification variable than does a sharp line. To determine the
applicable tax regime under a sharp line, the taxpayer must know only
whether x exceeds the threshold x. Under a sliding scale, the taxpayer
must know the precise value of x, since that value determines the
relative weighting between the two tax regimes.
The second reason a sliding scale tends to be more informationally
complex is that determining liability under the second potential tax
regime-the one that would not apply under a sharp line-might require
additional informational inputs. Consider the residency requirement a
child must meet to qualify a taxpayer for the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC). Under the current sharp line rule, the child must reside
with the taxpayer for 183 days or more during the year.68 Under a
sliding scale version of this rule, a taxpayer might qualify for a credit
66 IRC § 1361.
67 It would also generate many other complexities, such as how to treat entities where the
number of shareholders changes during the tax year (perhaps the maximum, or a weighted
average, could be used), or challenges related to consistency in treatment across years.
68 IRC § 152(c)(1)(B).
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amount that varies in proportion to the number of days the child
spends with the taxpayer. Under the sharp line, a taxpayer who lived
with the child for fewer than 183 days would not be able to claim the
child for the credit, and hence would not have to provide the other
information required to determine the allowable EITC (at least
assuming the taxpayer doesn't qualify on some other grounds). In
contrast, under the sliding scale, the taxpayer would have to provide
other potentially relevant information for determining EITC, such as
the breakdown between earned and unearned income.69
Finally, the above discussion indicates that the informational
complexity of a sliding scale depends in part on the granularity of the
classification variable. When the classification variable is coarser than
a pure sliding scale (but still less coarse than a sharp line), the
informational complexity can be alleviated. Considering the child
residency example described above, a version of a sliding scale that
would be less informationally complex would be to apportion the EITC
based on the number of months during the year in which the child
primarily lived with the taxpayer. This could reduce the amount of
information a taxpayer would have to keep track of: If a child spent
most of a month with the taxpayer, the taxpayer would not have to
keep track of the precise number of days of shared residence.70
C. Implications for the Complexity of Tax Filing
Although sliding scales tend to be more complex than sharp lines
(both computationally and informationally), the overall effect on the
complexity of tax filing varies dramatically by context. Given that 95%
of taxpayers rely on assisted preparation, computational complexity
tends not to be a substantial drawback to using sliding scales today.
Even if the tax law imposed a large number of sliding scales, the
required calculations are trivial given the computing power of modern
computers.
In contrast, even with assisted preparation methods, the role of
informational complexity remains important.71 Recall that sliding
scales are more informationally complex because they require more
69 See Goldin, note 64.
70 An example of a hybrid sharp line/sliding scale currently in the tax code is the formula
for the dividends received deduction, which allows corporations a deduction for dividends
they receive based on the degree to which they control the issuing corporation. That sliding
scale is quite coarse because there are only three categories for the degree of control. See
IRC § 243. Note that this provision resembles a sliding scale because the amount of
deduction varies according to a nonbinary classification; it resembles a sharp line because
the amount of deduction is fixed within a category.
71 See generally Lawrence Zelenak, Complex Tax Legislation in the TurboTax Era, 1
Colum. J. Tax L. 91(2010).
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granular information on x and because the additional tax regimes a
taxpayer must apply might require additional information. The
importance of both of these factors for tax filing varies significantly by
setting. For most sharp lines that depend on the date of an event-such
as childbirth, marriage, or the capital gains holding period-the extra
informational complexity from converting a sharp line to a sliding scale
is trivial or nonexistent, since the single date already contains all of the
information required to calculate x. In other settings, where
determining a taxpayer's value of x requires keeping track of many
events-for example, days spent in a state during a year, or days a child
resides with a taxpayer-the additional complexity of a sliding scale
relative to a sharp line can be substantial.72 Cutting against this,
however, is that taxpayers who are close to the threshold under a sharp
line would already need to keep track of the classification variable with
a high degree of precision.73
Finally, in cases when a sliding scale does increase the complexity of
the filing process relative to a sharp line, the overall effect on social
welfare depends in part on whether the additional complexity deters
taxpayers from filing a return in the first place. For most taxpayers with
a filing requirement, we suspect this possibility is remote, since failing
to file is often detectable by the IRS (at least for taxpayers with income
reported on information returns), and the penalties for failing to file
are nontrivial. However, for taxpayers without a filing requirement and
who are owed a refund, it is possible that the additional informational
complexity of a sliding scale will deter some taxpayers from filing,
making them worse off by causing them to miss the refund they would
otherwise receive.74
D. Implications for the Complexity of Tax Planning
In addition to affecting the complexity of preparing one's taxes, the
policy choice between a sharp line and a sliding scale also affects the
complexity of tax planning-that is, the process by which individuals
72 Technological improvements might lessen these record-keeping costs in the future-
for example, if more taxpayers use smartphones that can automatically record the taxpayer's
time spent in various states over the course of the year. See generally, Kathleen DeLaney
Thomas, User-Friendly Taxpaying, 92 Ind. L. J. 1509 (2017) (discussing how the complexity
of tax laws may encourage taxpayer dishonesty, as well as calling for the utilization of
technology to simplify specific aspects of the taxpaying process).
73 See Stewart, note 39, for an extreme example of the record-keeping requirements a
sharp line rule can impose on taxpayers.
74 One way to avoid this outcome could be to offer taxpayers an election between
selecting the sliding scale and being taxed under the less advantageous regime. This would
alleviate some of the welfare costs for taxpayers who would suffer most from the complexity
of a sliding scale.
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take taxes into account when determining their behavior. In general,
tax planning grows more complex as it becomes more difficult for
taxpayers to account for and predict how potential decisions would
affect their tax liability. As with tax filing, the difficulty of making these
determinations under a sharp line or a sliding scale depends on both
computational and informational complexity.
First, to the extent a sliding scale is more informationally complex
than a sharp line, tax planning under the former may be more difficult
than under the latter. By increasing the information on which tax
liability depends, switching from a sharp line to a sliding scale would
make it harder for taxpayers to predict their exact tax liability under
various choices of x, even if they are using tax software for assistance.
For example, consider the problem faced by taxpayers attempting to
estimate their marginal tax rate when the state residency rule is a
sliding scale, and when taxpayers split the year between states with
different tax rates. Taxpayers might expect with high confidence to
spend less than half of the tax year in a particular state (simplifying the
task of predicting their marginal tax rate under the sharp line), but not
be able to predict with confidence exactly how many days they will
spend in each state, and hence, the degree to which each state's tax rate
will apply. In other cases, such as when selecting a date to get married
or when to sell a stock, the additional informational complexity of a
sliding scale is unlikely to make tax planning more difficult.
Turning to computational complexity, the question of whether a
sharp line or a sliding scale better facilitates tax planning is ambiguous.
On the one hand, the higher computational complexity of a sliding
scale makes it more difficult for taxpayers to calculate their precise tax
liability under any potential choice of x. However, the practical
importance of this concern is mitigated by the fact that estimating one's
tax liability ahead of time with any degree of precision is already quite
difficult, even when only sharp lines are involved. Taxpayers who care
about making an accurate prediction would probably rely on software,
even absent a sliding scale. And as discussed above, sliding scales tend
not to meaningfully increase the computational complexity
experienced by taxpayers who use software. Hence, smoothing a sharp
line into a sliding scale would not usually make tax planning much
more complex.
In addition, a sliding scale could actually simplify tax planning in
some cases, by making it easier for taxpayers to understand the tax
implications of the choices they make. In particular, it is often easier to
understand how changes in x affect tax liability under a sliding scale,
because understanding the relationship between tax liability and x
does not require predicting whether x will cross a particular threshold.
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For example, under the sliding scale approach to the EITC child
residency requirement, it is easy for taxpayers to understand-in
general terms-that the more days the child lives with the taxpayer, the
larger the taxpayer's EITC. In contrast, understanding the tax
implications of the taxpayer spending one more or one less day with a
child under the sharp line version of the rule requires that the taxpayer
learn both where the line is (i.e., at 183 days), as well as predict the
number of other days during the year the child will spend with the
taxpayer.75
Apart from differences in the cost of tax planning associated with a
sharp line and a sliding scale, the two instruments also differ in the
incentives they generate for taxpayers to undertake tax planning in the
first place. We return to these considerations in Part VI below.
IV. FAIRNESS AND CLASSIFICATION CONSIDERATIONS
In this Part we focus on considerations related to horizontal equity,
and more generally, the rationale for imposing different taxes on
individuals with different values of the classification variable. Because
the rationales for differential taxation can vary dramatically across
contexts, our discussion in this Part is necessarily general.
Our main claim is that when there is a reason to differently tax
individuals with x = 1 versus x = 0, it will usually be the case that the
same reason implies that taxpayers with intermediate values of x
(between 0 and 1) should be taxed somewhere between those with x =
0 and those with x = 1. This issue has been discussed outside of the tax
context,76 and its application to tax is straightforward. As one
influential treatment of the subject has put it: "Smooth relationships
often do a better job of preserving morally relevant information than
do bumpy relationships."77
There are two steps to our argument. First, note that most reasons
for differential taxation across taxpayers have to do with
considerations that vary in degree, rather than in kind. For example,
taxpayers might be treated differently by the tax law because they
differ in their ability to pay. Ability to pay exists upon a continuum;
someone who earns $10,000 a year has less ability to pay a $1000 tax
than someone who is otherwise identical but earns $20,000 a year, and
the latter has less ability to pay the tax than someone who earns $30,000
a year. Similarly, under a Mirleesian optimal tax, otherwise identical
75 Put differently, to the extent taxpayers make tax planning decisions on the margin, a
sliding scale will likely be easier for taxpayers to understand than a sharp line because the
marginal effect of a change in x does not depend on the level of x relative to z.
76 See, e.g., Alexander, note 7 (discussing this issue in the philosophical context).
77 Kolber, note 7, at 657.
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individuals may be taxed at different rates based on the elasticity of
their labor supply, and the elasticity of labor supply falls along a
spectrum.
The second step of the argument is to note that when taxpayer
characteristics can be ordered along a spectrum (i.e., when they can be
represented by a variable like x in our model), the relationship
between the characteristic and the underlying objective is typically
continuous. That is, small changes in the characteristic translate into
small changes in the degree to which the underlying objective is
satisfied. For taxes that vary based on ability to pay, small changes in
income would typically translate into small differences in ability to
pay.78 For taxes that vary based on the elasticity of labor supply, small
differences in elasticities would typically translate into small
differences in tax rates.
These claims suggest that if tax liability is to depend on a
classification variable, the relationship should be continuous-that is,
small changes in the classification variable should translate into small
changes in tax liability. A sharp line fails this requirement: Near the
line, small changes in the classification variable imply large changes in
tax liability. Away from the line, small changes in the classification
variable do not result in any change in tax liability at all. In contrast,
the sliding scale maps small changes in the classification variable to
small changes in tax liability.
The arguments in this Part imply that tax liability should depend
continuously on the classification variable, but do not necessarily imply
that the relationship should be linear (as under a sliding scale). In
settings where the relationship between the underlying classification
rationale and the classification variable is discontinuous or highly
nonlinear, a sharp line might do a better job approximating this
relationship than a sliding scale.
To illustrate, consider a transaction in which a corporation redeems
its stock from a shareholder. Depending on the circumstances, the
transaction may either be taxed as if the shareholder exchanged its
stock with a third party or as if it received a corporate distribution.
Section 302(b)(2) specifies that the transaction will be taxed as an
78 To take a different example, child tax benefits are often justified based on differences
in ability to pay between taxpayers with and without children. However, the head of
household filing status contains a sharp line based on the number of children a taxpayer
claims; a taxpayer must claim at least one child to qualify for the benefit, but the benefit
amount does not increase in the number of children claimed. Because supporting additional
children tends to reduce a taxpayer's ability to pay, smoothing out the benefit into a sliding
scale could better further the goals of the provision. See Jacob Goldin & Zachary Liscow,
Beyond Head of Household: Rethinking the Taxation of Single Parents, 71 Tax L. Rev. 367
(2018).
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exchange if the distribution is "substantially disproportionate" with
respect to the shareholder, which requires, among other things, that the
shareholder ends up owning less than 50% of the corporation's total
voting power following the transaction's completion.79 If one of the
goals of the provision is to distinguish between transactions that affect
shareholders' control of the corporation, employing a sharp line at 50%
makes sense, since the relationship between voting power and control
is itself discontinuous at 50%. Although it is possible to imagine other
examples where the underlying objective of a provision is
discontinuous, it is difficult to think of many practical applications in
which this is likely to be the case.
A related consideration is that sharp lines tend to violate basic
notions of fairness and horizontal equity by treating differently
taxpayers who happen to fall on opposite sides of the line, but who are
otherwise quite similar. For example, under the sharp line in current
law, a child born at 11:59 p.m. on December 31 can qualify the parent
for the full year's Earned Income Tax Credit (up to $3400 in 2017 for a
parent with one child); but if the child is born just a few minutes later,
the parent would, at most, qualify for the childless EITC, with a
maximum credit of only $510.80 Because two otherwise identical
parents, with children born only minutes apart, appear alike in all
normatively relevant dimensions (such as ability to pay), it seems
arbitrary and unfair for their tax liabilities to differ by thousands of
dollars.81 In contrast, under a sliding scale, in which each parent could
claim the credit in proportion to the fraction of the tax year that elapses
after the child is born, each parent could claim a similar amount of
EITC for the year. Finally, note that the unfairness of a sharp line can
be exacerbated in its effect on welfare through individuals'
psychological aversion to "near misses," which sliding scales tend to
avoid.82
V. TAX ADMINISTRATION CONSIDERATIONS
This Part considers the relative ease of administering a sharp line
versus a sliding scale. By administrative costs, we mean costs incurred
79 IRC § 302(b)(2)(B).
80 IRC § 32(b); Rev. Proc. 2016-55.
81 Of course, the parent of the child born in the new year might qualify for an extra year
of EITC nineteen to twenty-four years later, when the older child has aged out. IRC §
152(c)(3). This later benefit is reduced by the time value of money and the possibility that
the parent's income will have changed by the later date so-that he or she no longer qualifies
for the credit.
82 See Adam J. Hirsch & Gregory Mitchell, Law and Proximity, 2008 U. Ill. L. Rev. 557,
587-89.
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by the taxing authority-unlike complexity costs, which are borne by
individual taxpayers.
One type of administrative cost associated with sliding scales is their
enhanced informational requirements relative to sharp lines. In this
respect, the considerations parallel the difference in informational
complexity between sharp lines and sliding scales; the latter require the
taxing authority to collect more granular information about the
classification variable, and may also require additional information to
be collected for purposes of calculating a taxpayer's liability under a
second tax regime.
How do these additional informational requirements affect
administrability? As with informational complexity for the taxpayer,
the practical importance of these considerations varies greatly by
setting. If an information reporting regime is already in place, there
may be little incremental cost to expanding the system to cover
additional taxpayers (although there may be costs on other parties, like
employers, from expanding such a system). Similarly, the finer
granularity of the information required under a sliding scale will not
much increase administrative costs when the information can be
derived from other information that is easily available. For example,
Form 1040 already asks for the birthdays of children claimed on the tax
return, even though all that is technically required by any provision is
whether the child's age is above or below some threshold.
A second consideration for assessing administrative costs under the
two types of instruments is that sliding scales can reduce the stakes of
many enforcement determinations, and correspondingly, the amount
of taxpayer pushback such determinations provoke. To illustrate,
consider an analogy from a very different context. In soccer, a foul
committed just outside the penalty box has a much lower likelihood of
leading to a goal than a foul committed just inside the penalty box.
83
Because of this large discontinuity in the location of where the foul
occurred, soccer referees have turned to video assisted review, which
has been criticized for slowing the pace of the game. If the rule for
assigning penalty kicks were replaced by a sliding scale, there would be
less pressure on referees to determine exactly where the foul occurred
83 A foul committed outside the penalty box will result in a free kick at the spot of the
foul, at least eighteen yards from the (center of the) goal and will sometimes present a poor
shooting angle. By contrast, a foul committed just inside the box will always result in a
penalty kick from twelve yards away from the goal, dead center. As a result, a foul just inside
the box leads to a goal about 80% of the time in World Cup games, compared to a foul just
on the other side of the line, where even from the most favorable positions, one study found
that less than 25% of free-kicks turn into goals. See Stan Ivanov, Penalty Kick Statistics at
FIFA World Cups-Expected Goals, http://intelligentfc.com/penalty-kicks-expected-goals-
at-fifa-world-cup/; Daniel Link et. al, A Topography of Free Kicks in Soccer, 34 J. Sports
Sciences 2312, 2316 (2016).
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and video replay as to the exact location of the foul would not be
necessary.
Finally, a sliding scale might make it harder for the taxing authority
to target enforcement efforts where they are most likely to be effective.
With a sharp line, there is typically little revenue to gain by auditing
taxpayers' reported values of x for taxpayers who are far from the line
(in either direction), at least in cases where it is more difficult to cheat
by a lot than it is to cheat by a little.84 In contrast, with a sliding scale,
there will generally be some incentive for all taxpayers to cheat,
making it harder for the tax authority to identify high potential returns
to audit.
VI. TAX PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
This Part considers how the choice between sliding scales and sharp
lines affects taxpayers' propensity to engage in tax planning. By tax
planning, we mean the process by which taxpayers account for taxes in
deciding on their behavior. From a societal perspective, tax planning is
generally undesirable for two reasons. First, to the extent it is costly for
taxpayers to engage in, it diverts resources that could have gone to
other productive uses. Second, when taxpayers adjust their behavior to
reduce their tax liability, they generate deadweight loss, which reduces
the efficiency of the tax. Against these factors, failing to plan causes
taxpayers to make privately suboptimal decisions, which also factors
into social welfare.85
To understand how sharp lines and sliding scales might affect tax
planning, we consider a "bounded rationality" model of decision-
making. Specifically, we assume that it is costly for taxpayers to account
for the tax when making their decision about x. These costs may be
financial-such as the opportunity cost of time spent thinking about
tax considerations or the fees charged by tax lawyers or accountants-
or nonfinancial, such as the unpleasantness of engaging in difficult
calculations or thinking about taxes in the first place. We assume
taxpayers decide whether to engage in tax planning by comparing the
expected benefits of accounting for the tax in their decision-making to
the costs of doing so. As we describe below, the choice between sliding
scales and sharp lines can potentially affect both the benefits and costs
sides of this trade-off.
84 Or, similarly, taxpayers may have a disproportionately strong moral aversion to
understating their tax liability by a lot as opposed by a little.
85 See generally Jacob Goldin, Optimal Tax Salience, 131 J. Pub. Econ. 115 (2015); Jeffrey
B. Liebman & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Schmeduling (Apr. 2003) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with the Tax Law Review).
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With respect to the costs of tax planning, our discussion in Part III
indicates that either a sharp line or a sliding scale can make tax
planning costlier. Sharp lines are less computationally complex-
making it easier for taxpayers to estimate their precise tax liability-
but the question of how changes in one's behavior affect tax liability
may be easier to answer under a sliding scale. Hence, depending on the
situation, smoothing a sharp line into a sliding scale may either increase
or decrease the costs of tax planning.
In addition, the choice between sharp lines and sliding scales also
affects the benefits of engaging in tax planning. Again, however, which
approach produces a larger benefit depends on the setting. Consider,
for example, an individual whose ideal value of x is just to the right of
the sharp line cutoff Y. Under the sharp line, such an individual faces a
large incentive to take taxes into account when choosing a value of x.
For this taxpayer, the sharp line creates a large benefit to tax planning.
In contrast, taxpayers who are confident that their value of x is far from
the cutoff will have little reason to account for the tax under a sharp
line, because considering taxes is unlikely to cause them to change their
behavior.
Under the sliding scale, the incentive to engage in tax planning is
evened out among taxpayers. For taxpayers who were confident they
were far from the cutoff under a sharp line, the incentive to account for
the tax is increased under a sliding scale. In contrast, taxpayers who
were near the line under a sharp line face a much smaller incentive to
account for the tax under the sliding scale because there is less scope
for them to reduce their tax liability by adjusting their behavior. As
with efficiency, therefore, the question of which type of instrument
results in a net increase in the benefits of tax planning depends in part
on the distribution of taxpayers' ideal points.
Overall, it is difficult to draw general conclusions about whether the
sharp line or sliding scale results in more tax planning. Depending on
the situation, either instrument may increase or decrease the costs of
tax planning, and similarly, either instrument may increase or decrease
the benefits. The net effect of these considerations is therefore likely
to vary based on the setting.
VII. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
This Part considers a range of additional considerations that affect
the policy choice between sharp lines and sliding scales.
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A. Standards versus Rules
Up to this point, we have focused on the choice between sharp lines
and sliding scales in the case of rules, where the legal outcome is a
known determinative function of a set of specified conditions. In this
Section, we extend our analysis to the case of standards, where the legal
outcome follows from applying a general principle. To preview our
results, we argue that the case for sharp lines is stronger when the test
under consideration is a standard. In such cases, the efficiency
differences between sharp lines and sliding scales tend to be less
pronounced, and the administrative and complexity advantages of
sharp lines tend to be more extreme.
Like rules, standards can be designed either as sharp lines or as
sliding scales.16 The reasonable person concept underlying negligence
torts is a classic example of a sharp line standard. Consider defendants
whose actions cause damage to plaintiffs. If defendants' level of care
even slightly exceeds that of reasonable people, they are not negligent,
and therefore have no tort liability. If defendants had been slightly less
careful, however, they could face liability for the full amount of the
plaintiff's damages. In contrast, a sliding scale version of the negligence
standard might assign liability to the defendant for the plaintiff's
damages based on the degree to which the defendant took care.
Turning to tax law, it is easy to imagine possibilities for smoothing
out some of the sharp line standards in place today. For example, to
determine whether a transfer between taxpayers constitutes a gift, the
key question is whether the transferor's motivation was sufficiently
"detached and disinterested." If so, the recipient of the transfer can
exclude it from income; if not, the recipient must include it in income.
In theory, the current sharp line standard could be replaced by a sliding
scale standard, so that if the transferor's motivation was, say, 70%
detached and disinterested, the recipient would include 30% of the
transferred amount in income. Similarly, the sharp line test that
currently divides employees from independent contractors could be
replaced by a sliding scale, in which treatment would depend on the
degree to which a work relationship satisfies the various factors that
form the current test.
In considering the choice between sharp line standards and sliding
scale standards, several aspects of the analysis are worth keeping in
mind. First, as mentioned above, standards often generate ex ante
86 Seemingly against this claim, David Weisbach argues that rules create discontinuities in
the law whereas standards generate continuous legal treatment. See Weisbach, note 60.
From Weisbach's discussion, however, it is clear that the only form of rule that he is
considering is a sharp line. Our analysis builds on his by allowing for classification tests that
provide certainty to taxpayers while also being continuous in the incentives they generate.
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uncertainty for taxpayers, in the sense that taxpayers cannot predict
with complete accuracy how their choices will shape their tax liability.
As discussed in Part II.F, in settings with uncertainty, the behavioral
incentives generated by sharp lines more closely resemble those
generated by sliding scales.87 Hence, efficiency considerations tend to
be less important when choosing between sharp lines and sliding scales
in the case of a standard relative to a rule.
Another relevant consideration is that the factors that determine
how taxpayers are classified under a standard can be difficult to
quantify.88 This matters because under a sliding scale, tax liability
depends on the exact value of the classification variable, not simply on
whether it exceeds a particular threshold. For example, in considering
whether a transfer should be considered a "sham" for tax purposes,
how would a taxpayer or the tax authority attempt to quantify the
degree to which it was or was not a sham? Of course, this quantification
problem also arises under a sharp line, since one must compare the
classification variable to the relevant threshold, but the additional
demands of the sliding scale to precisely quantify the classification
variable for all taxpayers can exacerbate these difficulties.
Finally, a frequently cited benefit of standards over rules in the tax
context is that they are less conducive to aggressive tax planning.8 9
Under a (sharp line) rule, the argument goes, taxpayers can walk right
up to the line without crossing it to reduce their tax liability by the
maximum amount allowable. In contrast, under a (sharp line) standard,
the precise location of the line is unclear, which means that more
aggressive transactions run a greater risk of receiving dis-favorable tax
treatment. Because sliding scale rules also smooth the tax liability
associated with taking aggressive positions, they also reduce the
incentives to engage in aggressive tax planning. Unlike sharp line
87 Similarly, this perspective suggests modeling settings characterized by both a standard
and a safe harbor and/or sure shipwreck as a Z-shaped expected liability function, where
expected liability rises smoothly over intermediate values of x, but jumps discretely at the
level of the classification variable that the safe harbor or sure shipwreck kicks in. For an
analysis of the incentives faced by taxpayers in such settings, see Morse, note 41, at 1399-
1402 & fig. 1; see also Raskolnikov, note 60, at 509-13 (discussing the behavioral effects of
settings characterized by changes in the slope of the relationship between taxpayer behavior
and expected tax liability).
88 Indeed, part of what makes a standard a standard is the law's unwillingness to specify
ex ante what the dispositive factors will be. Examples of this are common in tax. For
example, the Ninth Circuit applies a nonexclusive, unweighted, eleven-factor test for
distinguishing debt and equity for tax purposes. The Ninth Circuit recently observed that
"while such a free-floating inquiry is hardly a paragon of judicial predictability, it's the
necessary evil of a tax code that mistakes a messy spectrum for a simple binary, and has
repeatedly failed to offer the courts statutory or regulatory guidance." Hewlett-Packard Co.
v. Commissioner, 875 F.3d 494, 498 (9th Cir. 2017).
89 Weisbach, note 60.
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standards, however, they do so without creating uncertainty for
taxpayers. Hence, sliding scale rules may be particularly desirable in
settings in which taxpayers are risk averse and in which the government
is concerned with preventing aggressive tax planning.
B. Intent-Based Classifications
One special category of rules and standards that are prevalent
throughout the tax code are those that turn on an individual's intent or
purpose in undertaking some activity. Some prominent examples
include the "primary business purpose" test for certain allowable
business expense deductions, the "detached and disinterested
generosity" motivation for classifying a transfer as a gift, and the
subjective intent prong of the "economic purpose" test. Each of these
classifications is currently structured as a sharp line; treatment is all-or-
nothing depending on whether the requisite test is satisfied.
As with other classifications, one could imagine smoothing out the
sharp lines governing intent-based classifications by replacing them
with sliding scales. For example, an otherwise-deductible business
expense that was 49% motivated by business considerations cannot be
deducted at all under current law, since the business motivation was
not the taxpayer's primary purpose, but 100% of the expense would be
deductible if instead 51% of its purpose was business-related. A sliding
scale version of this rule would treat these cases similarly, with 49% of
the expense being deductible in the first instance and 51% in the
second.
In thinking about the choice between sharp lines and sliding scales
in the context of intent-based classifications, some but not all of the
previously discussed considerations apply. On the one hand, the
rationale underlying the classification, as well as fairness
considerations, will typically support the sliding scale, as they do in
other areas of the law. Someone who undertakes an expense that is
51% business-motivated is similarly situated (with respect to the
objectives of the statute) to someone who undertakes the same
expense, but who is slightly more motivated by nonbusiness
considerations.9 The sliding scale respects this similarity, whereas the
sharp line does not.
On the other hand, the efficiency difference between sliding scales
and sharp lines is muted in the case of intent-based classifications. This
is because the variable underlying intent-based classifications is not
about the taxpayer's behavior-at least in most cases, one cannot
90 For a discussion of related issues, see Andrew Verstein, The Jurisprudence of Mixed
Motives, 127 Yale L.J. 1106 (2017).
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simply choose one's motivation behind an action. That is, consider
taxpayers who undertake an expense for 51% personal reasons. To
reduce their tax liability, they would prefer to reduce the personal
motivation to only 49%, but unlike the other settings we have
considered, they do not have the ability to do so. Put differently,
taxpayers cannot adjust the motivation with which they do something
to recognize a tax benefit; otherwise, every taxpayer would simply
choose the tax-preferred motivation! Because taxpayers do not choose
their motivation, intent-based classifications do not distort behavior in
this respect. On the other hand, because the taxing authorities and
courts must infer motive primarily from objective indicia like how the
taxpayers spent their time on a trip that had business and personal
aspects, the efficiency analysis sometimes applies well even to intent-
based classifications like primary business purpose.
Finally, as with standards, intent-based classifications are
challenging to implement as sliding scales because the classification
variable (i.e., the taxpayer's purpose) is difficult to quantify. What does
it mean for a taxpayer's purpose in taking some action to be 49%
personal versus 51% personal? Although it might be possible to
develop an approach for quantifying motivations in such a way that
would allow a sliding scale, doing so would likely be costly for
taxpayers and the tax authority to implement. A more practical
alternative to a sharp line in this setting might therefore be a granular
sliding scale, with multiple discrete categories (e.g., one's purpose
might be mostly business, mostly personal, or both business and
personal).91
C. Democratic Legitimacy and Privacy
A potential objection to sliding scales is that, by increasing the
complexity of the tax system, they make it less transparent, and a
transparent tax system is important for democratic legitimacy. We
think this concern is misplaced. Practically speaking, the relationship
between taxpayers' decisions and their tax liability is already quite
obscure, even under the current sharp-line-dominated system. It seems
unlikely that switching to a sliding scale would further reduce
transparency in any meaningful sense. If anything, a sliding scale might
actually be more transparent because it makes the relationship
between taxpayers' decisions and their liability more intuitive. Even if
91 One way to think about the problem here is that sometimes it is not actually sensible
to treat the underlying classification variable as continuous between 0 and 1. That is, it might
be possible to determine that some activities have more business-purpose motivation than
others, but still be unable to assign each activity a precise fraction for how much business
purpose it had, at least in any meaningful way.
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taxpayers do not know the precise amount by which slightly increasing
x will affect their tax liability, they can understand the qualitative
relationship under a sliding scale, and at least the direction of the
effect. In contrast, under a sharp line, taxpayers must understand
where they fall relative to the line to understand how their choices will
affect their liability.
By requiring greater granularity in information, sliding scales may
sometimes raise privacy concerns not present with a sharp line,
particularly with respect to where taxpayers (or their dependents)
spend their time. We think that-at least for nearly all practical sliding
scale proposals-this potential issue is fairly limited. Taxpayers who
split their time between states or countries already often must report
how many days they spent in each place.92Adopting sliding scales of the
kind we examine below would expand this requirement to a greater
number of individuals, but we think it is still fairly coarse information
compared to, for example, what is routinely given over to a taxpayers'
cell phone company.
D. Classifications Based on Income
This Section briefly considers special issues that arise with respect o
classifications based on income. In most areas of tax law where liability
varies by income, the conventional wisdom is that gradual phase-ins
and phase-outs are preferable to sharp lines (or cliffs, as they're often
referred to in this setting) because of the high marginal tax rates
generated by the latter. The tax code mostly reflects this conventional
wisdom-provisions that depend on income typically do so in a smooth
manner-but there are exceptions.93
For the most part, our analysis supports the conventional wisdom
that sharp lines in income are undesirable. From an efficiency
standpoint, our results imply that a sharp line is less distortive than a
sliding scale only when there is a dip in the distribution of taxpayers'
ideal, pretax incomes near the point that the sharp line is drawn.94
Although it is possible that social or regulatory factors might produce
92 See, e.g., NY State Tax Form IT-203-B.
93 Most importantly, the tax rates imposed by § 1 impose tax liability as a continuous
function of taxable income, although frequent confusion by elected officials and the media
about the difference between marginal and average tax rates suggests this point is not always
appreciated. See IRC § 1. In a different context, the industry and wage limitations for the
new § 199A deduction phase in gradually by income. See IRC § 199A. In contrast, the
unearned income limitation on EITC recipients operates as a sharp line. For many more
examples, see generally Viswanathan, note 15.
94 By "ideal," recall from Part II that we are referring to the amount of income the
taxpayer would choose to earn absent tax considerations.
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such a dip in the distribution (because of a minimum wage law, for
example), this seems unlikely in most cases.
Along the same lines, the factors that sometimes make a sliding scale
more informationally complex than a sharp line do not apply when the
classification variable is income. Even without the sliding scale,
taxpayers must already keep track of and report their precise income
(down to the nearest dollar) to the tax authority for purposes of
computing their tax liability. Hence, converting an income-based sharp
line into a sliding scale would not require any new information.
Finally, because the role of income-based requirements in tax law is
often to track ability to pay, and because ability to pay usually varies
smoothly in income, the underlying goals of the provision would also
typically support sliding scales when it comes to income-based
classifications.
E. Taxes Designed to Shape Behavior
A variety of real-world tax provisions are designed to deter behavior
that has negative externalities, and similarly various credits and
deductions are intended to promote behavior with positive
externalities. For example, § 162 denies deductions for the cost of
lobbying to help prevent the "spread [of] insidious influences through
legislative halls."95 The ban on such deductions applies even when the
lobbying expenses are solely for the production of income and can be
thought of as equivalent to a special tax on lobbying expenses levied at
the taxpayer's marginal tax rate.
If the goal of a tax was solely to encourage or discourage some
behavior by as much as possible (at a fixed level of revenue), the
optimal policy comparison between sliding scales and sharp lines would
proceed as in Part II. That is, whether sharp lines or sliding scales
induce a larger change in taxpayer behavior depends on the
distribution of taxpayers' ideal points-how they would choose to
behave if the tax did not exist. For example, when taxpayers' ideal
points are evenly distributed, the sliding scale induces a smaller
response from a larger share of taxpayers, whereas the sharp line
induces a large response from taxpayers close to the line. Thus, when
the goal of a provision is simply to affect behavior by as much as
possible, our prior analysis highlights how policymakers should
proceed.96
95 Textile Mills Sec. Corp v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326, 338 (1941).
96 When the outcome associated with crossing the sharp line is to incur a penalty or
reward, there might be an additional incentive effect from taxpayers desiring to be on the
"good" side of the line. A sliding scale would lack this additional motivational force.
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However, the efficiency analysis differs when the goal of a tax is not
simply to affect behavior by as much as possible, but rather to account
for some positive or negative externality. If every dollar spent on
lobbying creates the same harm-say $H-to the political process, for
example, then a sliding scale tax on lobbying expenses equal to $H per
dollar of lobbying will not create any deadweight loss.97 Instead, while
firms and individuals facing this tax will cut down on the amount of
lobbying they do relative to their private ideal points, the tax will make
them account for the marginal social harm of such lobbying and will
lead to the most efficient outcome.98
In contrast, a lobbying tax that takes the form of a sharp line cannot
induce the efficient outcome, at least when the location of the line does
not vary by taxpayer. Intuitively, efficiency requires that each taxpayer
account for the social costs and benefits of their behavior when
choosing x, but only some taxpayers are induced to do so under the
sharp line.99 On the other hand, when a line's location can vary by
taxpayer, sharp lines can be set to induce each taxpayer to select the
socially optimal value of x.100
F. Multifactor Tests
In some cases a tax classification depends on multiple factors. The
form of a multifactor test affects the range of possibilities for sharp
lines versus sliding scales.
First, consider a multifactor test where some or all of the individual
factors are themselves binary. In such cases, it might be possible to
smooth out the underlying factors themselves. For example, one of the
factors in the test for characterizing individuals as employees versus
independent contractors is the amount of control individuals have over
97 This is the classic "Pigouvian" tax. See, e.g., James M. Sallee & Joel Slemrod, Car
Notches: Strategic Automaker Responses to Fuel Economy Policy, 96 J. Pub. Econ. 981,
991 (2012) (observing that a Pigouvian tax equal to the marginal harm will be fully efficient
socially)
98 The social harm may differ, though, if it is based on other taxpayer attributes in addition
to the amount of lobbying the taxpayer does. In that case, the analysis is more complicated.
Accordingly, a sharp line may be more efficient than a linear sliding scale if the former more
closely resembles the optimal nonlinear Pigouvian tax schedule.
99 Those taxpayers who jump to i are in a sense overcompensating for the harm of
lobbying and the remainder who do not move in response to the sharp line do not account
enough for the harm they are causing. Formally there is deadweight loss because taxpayers
who jump to x could engage in a Pareto improving trade: Those at x would pay the non-
movers to slightly decrease their lobbying and allow those at x to lobby a bit more. The total
amount of lobbying would be unchanged, but the additional amount of lobbying is more
valuable to those at x because they are far from their private ideal point. Such a Pareto
improving trade cannot be made under the sliding scale. See Sallee & Slemrod, note 97, at
991-94 (providing formal demonstration of the welfare costs of these uneven incentives).
100 Martin L. Weitzman, Prices vs. Quantities, 41 Rev. of Econ. Stud. 477 (1974).
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how they perform their work. Suppose an individual exercises just
enough control that the factor comes out in favor of independent
contractor status. Alternatively, suppose individuals exercise near-
total control over how they perform their work. Under a sharp line,
these two cases would equally support the conclusion that the
individual should be classified as an independent contractor rather
than an employee. In contrast, a sliding scale would treat this factor as
more strongly supporting independent contractor status in the second
case than in the first.
A second possibility for smoothing out a multifactor test is to smooth
out the relationship between the individual factors and the legal result
that they determine. Suppose classification depends on two factors, y
and z. Let u represent an aggregation of y and z with weights
corresponding to the multifactor test, such that u is increasing in y and
z and u > u if and only if the high tax regime applies. Note that as
described, this multifactor test implements a sharp line based on u, and
therefore based on y and z as well, where the location of the line for
one factor depends on the value of the other factors as well. As with
single-factor tests, this multifactor test can be smoothed out by
assigning tax liability in proportion to u, rather than based on whether
or not u crosses the stated threshold. One simple version of this, when
the factors that enter into the test are binary, is to assign tax liability in
proportion to the number of individual factors that are satisfied.
How do the efficiency properties of sharp lines and sliding scales
differ in the context of multifactor tests? First consider the question of
whether to smooth out an individual factor that enters into a larger test.
The behavioral consequences of a sharp line here are similar to those
in the single-factor test setting; the main difference is that the tax
implications of crossing the line for one factor hinge on the resolution
of the other factors. When the factor in question is determinative, the
tax implications of crossing the line-and hence the deadweight loss
generated-will be particularly large. When the factor in question is
unlikely to be determinative, the incentives to account for the line will
be muted. Hence, the efficiency gains or losses from smoothing out the
sharp line are the same as in the single-factor case, but the stakes vary
depending on how likely it is that the factor in question will be
determinative.
Turning to the question of whether to smooth out the relationship
between the factors and tax liability, consider how the smoothness of
this relationship affects taxpayer decisions that relate to the factors.
Under a sharp line, the incentives to adjust one factor depend on the
resolution of the other factors as well. For example, when a taxpayer's
ideal values of y and z imply a value of u that is just above u, the
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taxpayer would face strong incentives to adjust y and z to lower u. The
deadweight loss that results would depend on which factor the taxpayer
adjusts, and the costs of making that adjustment.101 Under the sliding
scale, in contrast, all taxpayers face an incentive to reduce u by
adjusting y and z, but these incentives are smaller than those faced by
taxpayers near the cutoff under the sharp line. Hence, determining
whether the sliding scale or the sharp line is more efficient for the
multifactor test is similar to the analysis for a single-factor test, but the
key question concerns the distribution of u*, which in turn is based on
the distribution of taxpayers' ideal points for the underlying factors.
The analysis thus far has assumed that taxpayers and the tax
authority know the aggregation of individual factors demanded by the
multifactor test, so that both sides can calculate u. In practice,
multifactor tests are usually quite vague about how to aggregate
individual factors into an overall legal determination. Thus, in the
presence of such tests, the relationship between taxpayer behavior and
tax liability can be characterized by substantial uncertainty. As with
single-factor tests in the presence of uncertainty, the efficiency
consequences of the choice between sliding scales and sharp lines for
multifactor tests are therefore somewhat muted.
From a complexity and administration perspective, one potential
upside to a sharp line approach for multifactor tests is that it sometimes
allows taxpayers and the tax authority to ignore those factors that are
not determinative. For example, if under a sharp line multifactor test,
the value of one factor is so extreme that the overall test is likely to
come out in a particular direction, determining tax liability does not
require resolving the remaining factors. In contrast, under a sliding
scale, calculating tax liability requires resolving each of the potentially
relevant factors. Similarly, determining liability under a sliding scale
can require a more precise specification of how different factors are
aggregated to reach a particular result than under a sharp line, which
can be costly for the tax authority to articulate and complicated for
taxpayers to learn about and apply.
VIII. EXAMPLES
This Part applies our framework to a number of examples from
different areas of tax law.
101 Note that this analysis holds when the factors are binary, in addition to when they are
continuous; when they are binary, adjusting behavior so that u falls below the line may be
costlier because the change is more significant.
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A. Child Tax Benefits
Our first example relates to tax benefits for taxpayers with children,
such as the Child Tax Credit, the EITC, and the head of household
filing status. For each of these provisions, the basic definition of a
qualifying child comes from § 152(c) of the Internal Revenue Code,
which has been interpreted to encompass children born at any point
during the tax year.102 This rule embodies a sharp line: A child born on
December 31 can qualify the taxpayer for the full year's child tax
benefits, but a child born the next day, on January 1, cannot. The stakes
are significant; for low-income taxpayers, it could mean a difference of
$5000 or more in their tax refund for the year.
Converting the child birth date sharp line into a sliding scale would
be straightforward: Child tax benefits for newborns would be
proportional to the fraction of the year elapsed after the child's birth.
For example, a child born on January 20 in a non-leap year would
qualify for 345/365 of the benefit, since 345 days elapse during the year
after the child's birth. A child born on December 31 would qualify for
1/365 of the benefit. Note that the reform eliminates the year-end
discontinuity; the taxpayer whose child is born on January 1 of the
subsequent year would qualify for 0/365 of the benefit.103
The considerations discussed earlier in the Article support
converting the child's birth requirement into a sliding scale. The
efficiency benefits are likely to be positive but small. We have no
reason to expect the sharp line at December 31 corresponds to a dip in
the pretax distribution of ideal dates when parents would like to have
their children. Moreover, there is evidence that a small number of
parents react to the existing sharp line at December 31 by moving up
planned C-sections or induced labor.104 But the deadweight loss from
these changes is likely to be small assuming that most parents and
medical professionals would be unwilling to speed up delivery dates by
more than a week or two at most, regardless of the tax benefits.105 It is
102 See Rev. Rul. 73-156, 1973-1 C.B. 58; IRS Pub. 501, Dependents, Standard Deduction,
and Filing Information, Cat No. 15000U (Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/p501.pdf.
103 Presumably, the age limits would be reformed in parallel so that a child would qualify
the taxpayer for a fraction of the otherwise-allowable benefit in the year the child aged out
of eligibility.
104 The existence and magnitude of such effects have been studied and debated in the
literature. See generally Stacy Dickert-Conlin & Amitabh Chandra, Taxes and the Timing
of Birth, 107 J. Pol. Econ. 161 (1999); Sara LaLumia, James Sallee & Nicholas Turner, New
Evidence on Taxes and the Timing of Birth, 7 Am. Econ. J.: Econ. Pol'y 258 (2015).
105 It is also possible that some parents try to time conception so their child will be born
in November or December rather than January or February. Here, however, the taxpayers'
substantial lack of control over the exact date of conception and birth will blunt the
efficiency costs of using the sharp line.
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true that having a sliding scale would create a general incentive for all
children to be born slightly earlier in the year, but it would dramatically
lessen the incentive under current law to hasten delivery for kids who
would otherwise be born just after the start of the new year. Because
the potential tax savings from shifting the delivery date by a couple of
days or even weeks is relatively small under a sliding scale, we would
not expect it to generate much in the way of deadweight loss.
Turning to classification considerations, here the case for a sliding
scale is much stronger. The most frequently cited rationale for the child
tax benefits is that having children reduces the taxpayer's ability to pay.
All else being equal, a taxpayer with a child born on December 31 has
a very similar ability to pay as a taxpayer with a child born the next day,
on January 1. Hence, smoothing out the tax benefit in proportion to
the fraction of the year that the taxpayer supports a child will better
align the tax benefit with its rationale.
Finally, although sliding scales can sometimes be more complex than
sharp lines, this would not be the case for child tax benefits. In
particular, the extra computational complexity here is unimportant,
since it is easy for tax software to scale the size of the benefit based on
the child's birthday. Similarly, a sliding scale would not increase
informational complexity because the extra information (the child's
birthday) is (hopefully) easy for parents to provide.
Overall, our arguments support smoothing the child tax benefits
birth requirement from a sharp line into a sliding scale. There is little
downside in terms of additional complexity, some modest but
uncertain benefit in terms of efficiency, and a substantial upside in
terms of furthering the ability to pay goals that underlie the provisions.
B. Long-Term Capital Gain Holding Period
Current law distinguishes between the sale of "long-term" and
"short-term" capital assets, with gains from the former subject to a
preferential tax rate.1 6 If the taxpayer holds the asset for at least one
year, it is long term; otherwise it is short term. Today, the maximum
tax rate on long-term gains is 20%, whereas the maximum tax rate on
short-term gains is 37%, as with ordinary income.107 This classification
test is a sharp line: Gains from the sale of a capital asset held for exactly
one year are taxed at a much higher rate than gains from an asset held
one day longer.10 8
10 IRC §§ 1(h), 1222.
107 IRC §§ 1(h), 1222.
108 Under significantly older law, there was something closer to a sliding scale: "In 1934,
for instance, Congress provided for a decreasing percentage of gain to be taxable the longer
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How might the holding period line be converted into a sliding scale?
Because assets can be held indefinitely, a sliding scale would operate
over a subset of possible holding period lengths, such as a six-month
transition period (say between nine months and fifteen months) or a
one-year transition period (say between six months and eighteen
months).
Beginning with efficiency, the concern with a sharp line is that it
provides a large incentive for taxpayers to avoid selling marginal assets
when they have held the asset for slightly less than a year. The simple
model we proposed in Part I does not entirely fit this example, because
taxpayers do not choose a holding period for their assets at a single
point in time, but rather make sequential decisions about whether to
hold or sell the asset on any given day. On any day, taxpayers will
consider whether to hold or sell an asset based in part on their
expectations about its risk and return. If taxpayers are considering
whether to sell some asset after, say, an eleven-month holding period,
under the sharp line they will consider not only the asset's expected
risk and return, but also the probability that if they do not sell the asset,
they will continue to hold it until the one-year mark, at which point
they secure the favorable tax treatment. The closer in time to the one-
year mark, the greater the tax incentive to continue holding the asset.
In contrast, farther from the one-year threshold-say after holding for
only one month-the sharp line exerts less force because there's a
higher probability the taxpayer will decide to sell at some future date
prior to the one-year threshold.
In terms of magnitude, we expect moderate deadweight loss from
the sharp line. On the one hand, many capital assets are sold well
before one year or well after the one-year mark, even with the current
tax incentive. On the other hand, because the difference in tax rates
between short- and long-term gains is substantial, the pressure to hold
assets near the one-year mark is significant. As described above, there
is evidence that taxpayers respond to the sharp line; as shown in Figure
8, taxpayers realize gains at nearly five times the rate just after the one-
year line compared to the months leading up to it.109
Under a sliding scale, the tax-induced pressure to hold assets would
be far less extreme in the lead-up to the one-year mark. On the other
hand, a sliding scale would generate a new incentive for taxpayers to
continue holding assets even after the one-year mark, until the long-
the asset was held, ranging from 100 percent if the asset were held a year or less to only 30
percent of the gain if the asset had been held for more than 10 years." Michael Graetz,
Deborah Schenk & Anne Alstott, Federal Income Taxation: Principles and Policies 559-60
(8th ed. 2018).
109 See generally Dowd & McClelland, note 56.
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term classification was fully phased in. For dates well before the one-
year mark, there could be more pressure to hold the asset han under
the sharp line because the probability of achieving any tax saving would
increase (though the magnitude of the expected degree of tax savings
might fall).
Applying our efficiency analysis to the long-term/short-term capital
gain classification suggests that a sliding scale is likely to result in less
deadweight loss than a sharp line. Ex ante, we have little reason to
expect there to be a dip in the distribution of taxpayers' preferred
holding periods around the one-year mark. Similarly, the empirical
distribution of observed holding periods also provides no evidence to
support this view.
The longer the holding period over which the sliding scale is phased
in, the smaller the tax incentive faced at any individual point in time to
continue holding the asset. In contrast, when the sliding scale is phased
in over a narrow range around the one-year mark, the behavioral
effects (and deadweight loss) more closely resemble those of the sharp
line. The distribution of ideal holding periods for many assets is
relatively high right above zero,110 so one consideration in deciding
where to begin the sliding scale is to avoid distorting the behavior of
that group. For example, suppose the sliding scale phased in the
preferential rate between six and eighteen months. Then someone
whose ideal point was one month would need to hold for an additional
five months to start obtaining any tax benefit-a duration we suspect
is too long to distort the behavior of most investors.
Turning to classification considerations, it seems likely that a sliding
scale would better further the objective of the preferential tax rate on
long-term gains, but it is difficult to say for certain given that the
purpose behind the provision is notoriously unclear. Commonly cited
rationales include avoiding lock-in effects, offsetting the taxation of
nominal gains, and rewarding investors rather than speculators. All of
these objectives would seem to scale with time, consistent with a sliding
scale.
Turning to complexity considerations, the additional informational
complexity associated with a sliding scale would be minimal in this
context. The major informational input required to determine one's
liability under this regime would still be the holding period, which, as
under current law, can be determined based on the date of acquisition.
No new informational inputs would be required.
With respect to computational complexity, the challenges appear
manageable here as well, although there are some more difficult issues.
110 Id.
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For sales of a single asset that produce a capital gain, one would simply
calculate the weighted average of the long- and short-term rates, as
described above. If multiple assets were sold during the year, each gain
or loss could be bifurcated into a long-term and short-term component
based on the sale date. So an asset sold after exactly one year that
produces a $100 gain would be treated as if the taxpayer had realized
$50 of long-term gains and $50 of short-term gains (assuming one year
was the midpoint of the sliding scale transition range).
Overall, we conclude that switching to a sliding scale for the capital
gains holding period would enhance efficiency and further the goals of
the provision with very little downside in terms of additional
complexity.
C. Depreciable Property Placed in Service During the Year
When taxpayers place a depreciable asset in service during the year,
how much of a depreciation deduction should they be allowed?"1 The
current rule differentiates between personal property and most forms
of real property. For personal property, a half-year convention is
generally employed, meaning that the taxpayer treats property placed
in service at any point during the year as if it had been placed in service
at the midpoint of the year, entitling the taxpayer to 50% of the full
year's depreciation. However, if more than 40% of the taxpayer's
property is placed in service during the final quarter of the tax year, a
mid-quarter convention is used instead.'1 2 In contrast, the rule for real
property is to apply a mid-month convention, treating the property as
if it had been placed in service at the midpoint of the month.
3 An
analogous set of rules governs property that is disposed of during the
tax year.'1 4
Formally, the rules for determining the allowable depreciation
deduction resemble a sliding scale, in the sense that a taxpayer is
entitled to a depreciation deduction in proportion to the amount of the
year that transpires after the property was placed in service. In effect,
however, the use of conventions converts the sliding scale into a system
that more closely resembles a sharp line, or at least a hybrid of the two
approaches. In particular, a half-year convention on its own would be
entirely identical to a sharp line: Taxpayers who place property in
service on the last day of Year 1 would be entitled to 50% of the
deduction for Year 1, and 100% for Year 2. Taxpayers who place
11 IRC §168(d). The importance of the depreciation conventions for personal property
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property in service a few days later, after the start of Year 2, would not
qualify for any deduction for Year 1 and would instead be allowed a
50% deduction for Year 2.
The mid-month convention retains more of the sliding scale
character, but by treating the classification variable as quite coarse, it
embodies some of the properties of a sharp line as well. Specifically, it
creates a number of sharp lines (between each calendar month), but
the importance of these lines is diminished relative to the sharp line
between tax years under the half-year convention. For example,
taxpayers who place property in service on January 31 would qualify
for 23/24 of the deduction, whereas taxpayers who place property in
service on February 1 would qualify for 21/24 of the deduction. Thus,
the amount at stake is 1/12 of the deduction-far less than under the
half-year convention. On the other hand, treating a single day as the
level of granularity under a sliding scale would mean that a delay of
one day would result in the loss of 1/365 of the annual deduction.
We can apply our framework to provide some sense of the costs and
benefits of various conventions. First, consider the choice between
sharp lines and a pure sliding scale (by which we mean a sliding scale
defined at the daily level). With respect to the efficiency properties of
the two approaches, the key question concerns the timing of when
taxpayers would want to place their property in service, absent tax
considerations, as well as the intensity of those preferences and the
likelihood that taxpayers will adjust their timing decisions based on tax
considerations.
In general, a sharp line at the tax-year level (such as a half-year
convention) would be preferable on efficiency grounds if taxpayers
tended not o want to place additional property into service at the end
of the tax year. There are a variety of factors that will influence when
a firm would like to place property in service, including customer
demand, availability from suppliers, seasonal fluctuations, and soforth.
Overall, however, we see little reason to expect that taxpayers would
be particularly reluctant to place extra property in service before the
tax year's end, so we conclude that a sliding scale is likely to be more
efficient than a sharp line.
A sliding scale would probably not add much informational
complexity because most businesses would already be keeping track of
the date they placed property into service for accounting purposes, or,
at least in moderately sized businesses, would already have records of
doing so. This concern might vary across categories of property; it is
probably easier to keep track of when a building was first placed into
service than a small machine.
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A related consideration is that under a sliding scale, all taxpayers
would have to determine the precise date on which property is "placed
in service" for tax law purposes. Most businesses would be able to rely
on an accountant (or in the thorniest cases, a tax lawyer) to apply this
definition, but this would increase costs for the firm. In addition, very
small businesses might experience costs in having to undertake this
legal research themselves.1 5 In contrast, under a sharp line, the only
taxpayers who will need to apply this standard are those near the line,
where different potential interpretations of placement in service would
yield different tax years.
Finally, consider the trade-offs between a day-by-day sliding scale,
and a coarser sliding scale such as the one created by the mid-month
convention. From an efficiency perspective, we would typically expect
the day-by-day approach to offer some advantages, since there is little
reason to expect taxpayers to systematically tend not to want to place
property in service toward the end of the month. On the other hand,
the efficiency stakes between these options is much lower than with
respect to the mid-year convention, since the tax incentive of moving
from the beginning of one month to the end of the month before, while
present, is much smaller in magnitude than the incentive created by the
mid-year convention. At the same time, the monthly approach may
offer some advantages in terms of limiting informational complexity (it
is easier for businesses to keep track of the month property was placed
in service than the particular day), as well as the need for taxpayers to
learn and apply the details of the legal definition of "placed in service"
(assuming, that is, that most reasonable interpretations would agree on
the month). Because these considerations may vary by type of
property, one can imagine a rationale for applying a combination of
sharp lines and sliding scales of various degrees of coarseness, as the
law currently does, although of course that difference in treatment can
introduce its own lines (such as between personal and nonpersonal
property) that create their own distortions and complexity.
D. State Residency Rules
A recurring challenge in tax law is allocating a taxpayer's income
between multiple jurisdictions, such as when someone spends
significant time in multiple states, countries, or even, in some cases,
cities. Most jurisdictions take the approach of taxing residents
115 An additional factor exacerbating the computational complexity of a sliding scale is
that there is actually legal uncertainty over the precise requirements for when an asset has
been placed in service, such as whether a building that had received a certificate of
occupancy and was in a condition of readiness could be considered placed in service, even
though it was not yet open to the public.
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differently from nonresidents. Generally, jurisdictions tax nonresidents
only on income that has its "source" (i.e., it originates) there. For
residents, however, jurisdictions typically tax all income, regardless of
source, although typically they offer a credit for taxes paid by residents
to other jurisdictions on foreign source income.
In many cases, the test for whether an individual is a resident of a
jurisdiction depends at least in part on the fraction of the year the
taxpayer spends there. Such tests often revolve around a sharp line. For
example, people who are not domiciled in New York City but own a
house or apartment there are residents of the city (and thus subject to
its income tax) if they spend more than 183 days in the city limits.116 In
a different context, European Union law has been interpreted to
require that a country provide nonresidents earning 90% or more of
their income in the country the same tax exemptions that are available
to a resident.
Alternatively, residency classifications might turn on time spent in a
jurisdiction by use of a sliding scale. That is, the degree to which a
jurisdiction treats a taxpayer as a resident would vary continuously
based on the fraction of the year the taxpayer spends in the jurisdiction.
Thus, income sourced to a particular jurisdiction would continue to get
taxed to that jurisdiction, but other income would be allocated
proportionally among those jurisdictions for which a taxpayer is
treated (at least to some degree) as a resident. In addition, the right to
residual taxation of residents' foreign source income might likewise be
divided up proportionally."
116 See New York State, Income Tax Definitions, https://www.tax.ny.gov/pit/file/
pit_definitions.htm. Having a New York City home and spending 184 days or more of the
year in the city is sufficient, but not necessary, to be classified as a resident; someone with a
domicile in New York City would also qualify.
117 To be concrete, let's examine how these regimes might apply to a taxpayer, T, with an
unclear tax domicile and an apartment in New York City. T spent 185 days in Florida and
180 in New York last year. Assume T had $400 of wages in Florida (which is Florida source
income), $500 of wages in New York (which is New York source income), and $300 in
dividends received uring the year. Under a traditional sharp line approach, the dividends
will be sourced to T's state of residence only. For simplicity assume New York has a flat
income tax of 20% on its resident's worldwide income (and offers a credit for income taxes
paid to source jurisdictions) and Florida has no income tax.
Traditional Sharp Line:
If T is found to be a New York resident for tax purposes, she owes New York:
$240 = 20% - ($500 + $400 + 300).
T's worldwide income is $1200 and she paid no tax to any foreign source jurisdiction, so
she owes New York a full 20% on all income, or $240.
If T is a Florida resident, by contrast, she's only taxed in New York on New York source
income, which is just her New York wages, so she would owe New York:
$100 = 20% - ($500 )NY Source
2020] 293
There is a large literature on formulary apportionment approaches
of this sort, and we will only discuss the basics of how our framework
can shed light on the subject.
First, consider the efficiency trade-off. A sharp line can generate
intense incentives for taxpayers to adjust where they spend their time,
especially for those who are near the 183-day threshold. The efforts
that taxpayers expend to avoid being characterized as residents
constitutes deadweight loss to society. On the other hand, although the
incentive effects from a sharp line can be large, they are limited to the
relatively few taxpayers who are near the cutoff. A sliding scale, in
contrast, would generate a smaller incentive for many more taxpayers.
The simplest sliding scale, in which each additional day in a jurisdiction
affects the taxes owed to it, would affect virtually everyone who is
mobile between jurisdictions. For example, high-income taxpayers
from a high-tax state would face a large incentive to spend a few extra
days on vacation in a low-tax state, say Florida, to reduce their overall
tax liability for the year. Similarly, tourism in high-tax states would
likely suffer. Because there are so many more people who spend a
small share of the year traveling between states for vacation or work
than there are who spend near-equal amounts of the year traveling
between states, a sharp line is probably more efficient than this pure
form of a sliding scale. Put differently, there likely is a large dip in the
distribution of ideal points in this case.
On the other hand, a sliding scale with a de minimis exception could
well be more efficient than either a pure sliding scale or a sharp line.
Under this approach, taxpayers would be treated as part-year residents
Sliding Scale Only for Apportioning Income Whose Source Follows T's Residence:
Suppose a sliding scale is adopted for apportioning dividends and other income whose
source follows the taxpayer's residency. In this case, the $300 of dividends would be
180 185
proportionally split: $300. 36 as New York source and $300 -3 as Florida source.
Under this system, if T is a New York resident, she still owes New York $240. This is
because, as above, if T is a New York resident, the sourcing between New York and Florida
is irrelevant because she paid no tax to Florida. She has $1200 of total income and no tax
credits, so she owes $240. If Tis a Florida resident, she owes New York:
$129.58 = 20% - ($500 + $300 - 1 orc
\ 365/ NY Source
Full Sliding Scale:
By contrast, a full sliding scale would implicitly also proportionally divide up the right of
the taxpayer's state of residence to residually tax foreign source income.
Mechanically the sliding scale tax liability would just be a weighted average of how much
the taxpayer would owe if she were a resident and how much she would owe if not,
multiplied by the days in the state. So the taxpayer would owe New York:
180 (185
$169.04 = ($240=tax if NY Resident ' 6 $10=tax if Not NY Resident *
and the domicile determination would be irrelevant.
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of any state in which they spent more than, say, 90 or 120 days during
the tax year. Income would then be allocated among the states in which
the individual was at least a part-year resident, in proportion to the
days above the de minimis threshold spent in the state.118 Depending
on the distribution of taxpayers' ideal points above the de minimis
threshold, this modified sliding scale could well be more efficient than
the sharp line: Its distortionary effect would be smaller for the
taxpayers affected by the sharp line, and its effects would still be
limited to a relatively small number of taxpayers whose days in another
state exceeded or could plausibly be altered to exceed the de minimis
threshold.
Informational complexity is another important concern with a
sliding scale approach to state residency determinations. It could be
quite burdensome for taxpayers to keep track of the precise number of
days they spend in any particular state. Of course, taxpayers near the
line already have to keep track of this information, but that
requirement affects a small share of taxpayers. Again, however, a
modified version of the sliding scale could alleviate some of the
complexity costs, so that the only taxpayers who would need to keep
track of their dates would be the relatively small group who spend
significant fractions of the year in multiple jurisdictions.119 In addition,
it is possible that new technology, such as location-tracking capabilities
on one's phone, could ease the record-keeping costs for tracking
location over the course of the year.120
With respect to tax planning, a sliding scale could actually reduce
the computational challenges associated with tax planning about
residency decisions, since taxpayers would not need to spend as much
effort predicting the precise number of days in the year that they will
be in the jurisdiction. That is, under a sharp line, the costs of spending
an extra day in a jurisdiction hinge on the likelihood and importance
of spending future days in that jurisdiction during the tax year. Under
a sliding scale, in contrast, the tax implications of spending time in the
jurisdiction do not vary in this way.
118 Under this proposal, taxpayers who are not residents of any one state for at least ninety
days could have their incomes allocated across states using a smaller de minimis threshold
(e.g., sixty days).
119 If there is a fixed (e.g., computational) cost to participating in each jurisdiction's tax
regime, a system like this could generate additional deadweight loss by inducing taxpayers
to bunch just below the number of days at which they must begin computing tax liability
under the second jurisdiction's regime.
120 A different consideration is that to the extent jurisdictions require different
information because they use different definitions of the tax base this will also add to
informational complexity.
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E. Debt-Equity Divide for C Corporations
Economically, debt and equity are both claims on the cash flows of
business organizations that share in the risk and return of the
enterprise.121 Debt and equity, therefore, can be thought of as ends of
a spectrum whose underlying variable is a measure of the risk borne by
the holder and the expected return to the instrument.
Tax law nevertheless utilizes a sharp line that classifies nearly all
capital instruments as either entirely debt or entirely equity. To see the
sharp line, start by imagining paradigmatic debt: an unsubordinated,
unconditional promise to pay a sum certain with fixed interest at a fixed
date, issued by a well-capitalized firm. 122 Now start adding equity-like
features. Subordinate the instrument to existing debt holders; make the
periodic "interest" payments vary directly with the returns of the
company; add a provision allowing conversion of the instrument into
common stock. At some point-the law is very hazy on where-you
will have turned your instrument into equity, and after that, adding
further equity-like features will have no effect on the classification.
This is the sharp line.
Would a sliding scale work better here? Congress apparently has at
least toyed with this idea. In 1989, it revised § 385 to explicitly permit
Treasury to promulgate regulations that would treat issuances that fall
in the middle of the spectrum as part debt and part equity.123 Courts
have occasionally also bifurcated instruments.124 Moreover, there is
anecdotal evidence of firms trying to create instruments that are as
equity-like as possible while still trying to qualify for the (usually) more
favorable debt treatment125 and a sense this problem is increasing.126
121 Richard Brealey, Stewart Myers & Franklin Allen, Principles of Corporate Finance
230-35 (9th ed. 2007). Any debt instrument can be represented as a risk-free bond and a
short position in put options on the company's common stock. Because all debt creates an
implicit short position in the company's put options, this means that even paradigmatic debt
should lose a bit of value when the company's equity falls. This in turn reflects the fact that
every debt instrument-in the worst cases-may become the residual claimant on the
company's cash flows (if things go badly enough), the position we usually associate with
equity. Thus, no debt instrument is entirely free of the risks of the enterprise.
122 See IRC § 385.
123 See Anthony P. Polito, Useful Fictions: Debt and Equity Classification in Corporate
Tax Law, 30 Ariz. St. L.J. 761, 790 (1998).
124 See, e.g., Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d 694, 697 (3d Cir. 1968).
125 See Polito, note 123, at 789 (discussing adjustable rate convertible loans (ARCNs),
which were designed to meet the safe-harbor entitling an instrument to debt treatment
under Treasury's proposed regulations under IRC § 385, while being as far to the equity
side of the spectrum as possible).
126 Wolfgang Sch6n, The Distinct Equity of the Debt-Equity Distinction, Bull. for Int'l
Tax'n, Sept. 2012, at 490, 491, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2444648 ("In former times, the
rights of a shareholder and the rights of a bondholder could easily be distinguished from
each other, but modern financial engineering has created an infinite continuum of financial
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Nevertheless, after looking at the data, we are skeptical that creating
a sliding scale would yield large efficiency gains, at least for public C
corporations in their domestic operations. In Figure 11 we present a
very rough cut of the capital structure of U.S. public companies:
FIGURE 11








Total Common Total Preferred Total Total Fixed
Equity Stock and Floating Rate Long-
Convertible Rate Long- Term Debt
Debt Term Debt
Pure Equity Pure Debt
Source: Authors' calculation from Compustat data consolidated at the parent company level, as
of April 2018.
From an efficiency point of view, these data do not provide much
support for adopting a sliding scale here.127 The data do not show a
large bulge of capital issuances just on the tax-favored side of the debt-
instruments where more or less any combination of financial elements (risks and rewards)
and other entitlements (voting rights, cancellation rights, conversion rights, etc.) can be put
together.").
127 It is worth noting some caveats here. First, the data only cover public companies.
Private companies using venture capital likely make much greater use of instruments that
are in the middle of the spectrum-for example, convertible preferred stock. That said,
public corporations currently make up the vast majority of the tax base of C corporations,
so our analysis should be valid for C corporations. Second, our data are consolidated at the
level of the parent company. Our analysis does not speak to the capital structure within U.S.
multinationals and whether companies may be manipulating the debt-equity divide to
engage in profit shifting or otherwise avoid taxes in the international realm. See Sch6n, note
126. Finally, the consequences of being on one side or the other of the debt-equity divide
depend on, among other things, the corporate tax rate, the dividend and/or capital gains
rate, the (top) tax rate on ordinary income, and any limitations on the deductibility of
interest. At the moment, those factors combine to make the differences between debt and
equity much smaller for C corporations than under prior rate structures.
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equity line, unlike with, say, capital gains realization. Instead, the
issuances seem to be quite bimodal, with the vast majority of issuances
occurring toward one pole or the other of the debt-equity spectrum.
This in turn suggests that implementing a sliding scale might well be
less efficient than the existing sharp line, even if there were no
complexity and administrative costs to doing so. Facing a sliding scale,
firms that would, absent taxes, issue equity may slide down toward debt
a bit, even if they wouldn't have found it profitable to slide all the way
past the old sharp line.128
Complexity and administration would also pose serious challenges
to converting to a sliding scale. Congress and Treasury have struggled
without much success to give more clarity to the substantive law on
what distinguishes debt and equity.129 Implementing a sliding scale
would require substantially more guidance for placing instruments
along the debt-equity spectrum.
128 An example may illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of the analysis above. Our
model assumes that firms face convex costs in moving away from their ideal point. Assume
a company, ABC, would, absent taxes, raise additional capital as pure equity. Convex costs
imply that if taxes induce ABC to issue debt instead, it will choose floating rate notes rather
than going even farther from its ideal point and issuing fixed-rate bonds. As a result, if our
model is right, we can assume that the relatively small number of capital issuances just on
the debt side of the threshold indicates that taxes are not distorting the issuances of ABC
and similarly situated firms very often.
There is an important caveat to the analysis in the preceding paragraph, however. Tax
law's way of breaking down equity and debt may not reflect sound economics. Thus, a thirty-
year bond that pays a fixed rate guarantees ABC's access to capital for a long time. This
bond is arguably a closer economic substitute for pure equity-like common stock-which
gives ABC access to capital indefinitely-than a two-year floating rate note whose rate
depends on the performance of ABC. Tax law nevertheless considers the two-year floating
rate note closer to equity than the thirty-year bond. As a result, if taxes distort ABC's
decision, it may well choose a thirty-year bond and not the floating rate notes, both of which
are treated as debt for tax purposes, but the thirty-year bond is economically closer to ABC's
ideal point (even if tax law doesn't see it that way). Even if this is true, Figure 11 still
indicates that it would not increase efficiency much to create a sliding scale based on tax
law's existing definitions of debt and equity.
If such a sliding scale were adopted, the two-year floating rate notes would be taxed as
part equity and part debt, while the thirty-year fixed rate bonds would be taxed as all debt.
Under such a system, ABC would still issue the thirty-year bonds. So, no distortion is
eliminated for firms like ABC by the sliding scale. Meanwhile, some firms currently issuing
equity at their ideal points under the sharp line might switch under the sliding scale to
preferred stock, which would now be taxed partly like debt, just to get the tax advantages.
129 The House's proposed version of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 would have
provided a more rulelike approach to debt versus equity, but the Senate Finance Committee
deleted the proposed language, finding that "precise definitions which will classify for tax
purposes the many types of corporate stocks and securities will be frustrated by the
numerous characteristics of an interchangeable nature which can be given to these
instruments." S. Rep. No. 83-1622, at 4763 (1954). Likewise, when Congress added IRC §
385 in 1969, it called on Treasury to promulgate regulations to more clearly define the debt-
equity distinction. Treasury proposed regulations in 1980, but they were criticized and
subsequently withdrawn before going into effect. See also Polito, note 123, at 783-90.
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One could imagine a checklist approach using the primary measures
seen in the statute and case law-say five of them-like: Is there a fixed
repayment date with fixed interest? Is the instrument subordinated to
other capital providers, etc.? Falling on the debt side of all five factors
would create 100% debt; being on the debt side of four of the factors
would result in an instrument treated as 80% debt and 20% equity and
so on. The downside of such a system is that it may be easily
manipulated by taxpayers and would require evaluation of each of the
five factors by both taxpayers and the IRS for each issuance.
A more ambitious approach might equate equity with the amount of
risk borne by the holder and reflected in the expected return of the
issuance.130 A security would then be placed on the debt-equity
spectrum relative to the lowest-expected return security issued by the
corporation that is assumed to be pure debt. This approach would be
less easily manipulated than the checklist approach but would likely be
more difficult for both taxpayers and the IRS to apply.
IX. CONCLUSION
By studying the behavioral effects of sliding scales and sharp lines
under a range of assumptions, we have identified factors that tend to
make sliding scales more efficient than sharp lines for raising
revenue-at least when the distribution of taxpayer preferences does
not make it possible to draw the sharp line in a non-distorting way.
Thus, we think it makes sense for policymakers to start from the
presumption that a sliding scale would be more efficient. In some cases,
there might be good reasons to suspect the distribution of taxpayer
preferences is such that a sharp line would be more efficient, thus
overturning the presumption. And in other cases, a sliding scale will be
much more complex than a sharp line, undermining the case for its
adoption. Ultimately, the determination as to which type of instrument
is best should be made setting by setting, but we hope the general
principles outlined here can help guide that analysis.
130 For a proposal along these lines, see Polito, note 123, at 791-810. Note that this
approach partially accords with the existing case law, which, through multiple factors, seeks
in part to determine to what extent the holder of the issuance bears the risk of the enterprise.
Note, however, that the expected return of an issuance corresponds imperfectly to the risks
of the enterprise as examined in the case law because most risks specific to the firm can be
diversified away at low cost and will thus not be compensated in markets or affect the
expected return. See, e.g., Ayres & Fox, note 40, at 453-54.
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APPENDIX
EFFICIENCY ADVANTAGE OF SLIDING SCALE WITH
UNIFORM IDEAL POINT DISTRIBUTION
Consider a population of taxpayers who select values of x E [0,1] and
pay some tax that depends on their choice of x. Individuals choose x to
maximize
u = -a(x - x*)- _ T (x)
where x* denotes the individual's ideal point, a > 0, and T denotes the
function that maps behavior into tax liability, T: [0,1] -4 R. Individuals
are heterogeneous only in their ideal points, so we can write individual
behavior as x = x(x*, T). The distribution of ideal points in the
population is denoted by f. Social welfare under some tax function T
is therefore given by
w(T) = f (-a(x(x*, T) -x*)Z - T(x(x*, T))) f(x*)dx*
The tax function can either take the form of a sliding scale, Tss(x) _





The government's objective is to maximize social welfare subject to a
revenue constraint R:
maxw(T ) s.t. T (x(x*,T))f(x*)dx* > R
Proposition
Suppose that f is uniform. Let TSL denote a sharp line tax schedule that
satisfies the revenue constraint. Then there exists a sliding scale tax
schedule, Tss, such that Tss satisfies the revenue constraint and yields
higher social welfare, w(Tss) > w(TsL)
Proof
Suppose that TsL satisfies the revenue constraint, and let r denote the
amount of tax that is owed under TSL when x exceeds the cutoff.
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Taxpayers choose x by comparing their utility at x = - to the utility
achieved at their ideal point, which yields the following decision rule:
1
x* if x* < -
1 1 1 1




The revenue raised under TSL is given by r(TSL) _
f ,'r f(x*)dx* = T (1 - F( + Ta)), where F(-) is the
population ideal type cdf. Because f is uniform over [0,1], we have
r(TSL) = T - V/a). Without loss of generality, we assume that T is
on the correct side of the Laffer curve, so that = - i - 1/a 0, or
a
T <- (2)
Now consider a sliding scale tax schedule for which the tax rate is set
to the level of the tax under the sharp line, Tss(x) = T x. Our strategy
will be to show that this new tax raises at least as much revenue as TSL
and also achieves higher social welfare.
Under Tss, taxpayers select x to solve: maxxE[ol] - a(x - x*) 2 - TX,
which yields the decision rule:
T T
x* -- if x* -
x(x*, Tss) _ 2a 2a (3)
0 ifx* < -
2a
Total revenue under the sliding scale is therefore given by r(Tss)
f r (x* - ) f (x*)dx* = f T (x* - ) dx*, where the second
2a2a 2a 2
equality follows from the assumption that f is uniform. Adding and
subtracting fJan(x* -a-) dx* allows us to write r(Tss) = fo T1(x* -
dx* - fo r (x* - 2 dx*. Note that the second term is negative
because (x* - a) < 0 for x* E [0, 2a]. Hence, r(Tss) -_
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dx* = - za. Comparing this expression to r(TSL) yields a
sufficient condition under which the sliding scale generates more
revenue than the sharp line: r(Tss) > r(T s) <- T < 4a. Because Tss
is on the correct side of the Laffer curve, we have from (2) that r 9 <
4a, and hence, r(Tss) > r(TsL). Therefore, because TsL satisfied the
revenue constraint, it must therefore also be the case that Tss satisfies
the revenue constraint.
Next, we will show that w(TsL) < w(Tss). By definition, w(TsL)
fa - a(x(x*, TSL) - x*) 2f(x*)dx* = w(TSL) = - a(x(x*,TSL) -
x*) 2dx*, where the second equality follows from the uniform





x*) 2dx*. Evaluating this integral yields w(TsL) _ - 3a_/
Turning to welfare under the sliding scale, following the same steps as
T
before and using (3), we can write w(Tss) = f02 - a(x*)2 dx* +
f - a(Za)2dx*. Adding and subtracting fJ a ( a)2dx* yields
2 a 2
w(Tss) _ _ a (+)2dx* + a f"((2)2 - (x*)2) dx* >
- fo a ()2dx*= -a, where the inequality follows from the fact that
. (()2 - (x2) dx* is weakly positive (given the limits of
integration). Combining these results, a sufficient condition for
w(Tss) > w(TSL) is - 4a> 3 I T < a, which is implied by (2)..
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